Families, States and Militaries:
Changes in Relations and Conditions

Astuko Fukuura and Eyal Ben-Ari eds.

March 2019

Families, States and Militaries: Changes in Relations and Conditions

This collection is the product of a workshop held at the Faculty of Economics of Shiga University on November 18, 2018. The workshop sought to explore the transformations that military families are undergoing introducing cases from the Philippines, Portugal, South Korea, The Netherlands, Israel, and the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan[1].

The rationale for the workshop centered on developing previous work in the social scientific study families and the state. Much of this scholarly literature on states and families has focused on official policies (say for welfare or childrearing), the practices by which states shape and encourage family types, or the intervention of state authorities in problem families. A smaller number of research projects has focused on workplace dynamics of state employees (for example, administrative staff, managerial personnel, workers in state medical institutions or individuals' laborers in state industries), that is their conditions at work, their careering structures or decision-making. Yet almost no investigations have been carried out on the families of such employees. The one fascinating exception are military families.

These families are especially interesting: they are both similar to and different from the families of employees in other large state organizations thus allowing scholars to explore their unique characteristics. They are also different from other such families in that the organization that they belong to is an especially "greedy institution" (one that makes great demands on individuals in terms of commitment, loyalty, time, and energy)

thus putting unusual pressure on the employees and creating tensions with their families. Moreover, in the military there is a chance - like in fire-fighting - that members will become casualties thus adding a dimension not usually found in other organizations. Finally, while military families may be likened to those of commercial sailors where a key member may be away for long periods of time, since they are identified with state-mandated meanings and missions their dynamics may differ in significant respects.

Given these similarities and differences the chapters focused on following questions:

First, what characterizes the families of state workers, and especially military personnel, as opposed to the families of members of other large organizations? This question seeks to chart out the unique traits of such kin groups.

Second, what kind of state-mandated organizational arrangements are there for taking care of families (like housing, medical care)? This question is aimed at understanding the special role of the state in intervening in and shaping of the families of their employees and in our case military families.

Third, what kind of changes have these characteristics and arrangements undergone during the past decades? This question is centered on the major changes that have occurred in light of the changes in the state itself.

We hope that the individual chapters and the volume as a whole will provide good opportunities for further discussion.

Atsuko Fukuura and Eyal Ben-Ari, editors

The Promotion of Military Family Readiness

Within the United States Armed Forces

Christopher Udell

Combat Stress Platoon, Marine/ Okinawa

There have been wars since the dawn of human civilization. Wars require fighting forces. Until the 20th Century there was no concept of military family readiness. The financial circumstances, child education, and emotional well-being of family members of those fighting in conflict were of little concern to warring tribes or nations. For that matter, the care of soldiers was also frequently unaddressed or could not be addressed due to the lack of resources. It has been estimated that during the Revolutionary War, one-third of George Washington's troops didn't even have shoes despite the months they spent camped out at Valley Forge in frigid temperatures[1]. Thoughts about specialty pay, plans for the use of their G.I. Bill (i.e., educational assistance to service members), or calculations about how many Leave days they have remaining for vacation mostly likely did not pass through their minds.

Approximately 16 million Americans served in World War II and compared to their predecessors they were better equipped and supported, though not adequate by today's standards. Over 99% of them were male and about 61% were drafted into the war[2]. The majority of these men were single because those who were married before they received

3

a draft notice had the option of deferring service[3]. Very little is known about the demographic characteristics or service needs of the military spouses and children of WWII. The focus was on preparing the war fighter, and not on taking care of the fighter's family. But as was the case for most if not all nations involved in WWII, the people back home (including the spouses and children of service members) were active participants in the war on some level, whether in manufacturing plants or service industries, or by rationing resources needed for the war. There were two notable outcomes of U.S. entry into WWII that would ignite change for women and children. Prior to WWII, about 25% of women (generally unmarried women) worked outside the home, but were restricted to typically 'feminine' lines of work such as typing or sewing[4]. By 1945, 36.1% of the civilian labor force was female, and 22.5% of married women were working outside the home[5]. Moreover, they were employed in skilled labor professions that until the start of WWII had been restricted largely to men. After the war ended service men returned to the jobs they left and women once again confronted obstacles to gaining employment, but the landscape had forever changed— women were capable of performing the same jobs as men and expectations about women working outside the home had been transformed.

The second notable outcome of WWII was the recognition of the need for child care centers. As indicated above, over 20% of married women, along with an unknown percentage of single mothers, entered the work force. Suddenly there was an immediate need for childcare services. Nurseries and other childcare facilities existed prior to WWII. However, as early as the 1890's reform efforts were in place because these facilities were in poor shape on account of their reliance on insufficient donations and private funding[6]. Mothers who were the only source of income in the home and who

were forced to work in low paying jobs risked leaving their children in conditions where those children were exposed to neglect, sickness, and hazardous conditions. During WWII, Eleanor Roosevelt (and wife of then President Roosevelt) lobbied for the opening of more daycare centers and funding for these centers. By 1944 there were 3,000 childcare centers serving 130,000 children. The number of centers by no means met the needs of the roughly two million children needing care. But it represented a major shift from pre-WWII and a spark was lit that would impact awareness for the societal and governmental role in development and education of American children.

The U.S. armed forces comprised over 12 million personnel at the end of WWII. Although the U.S. has been engaged in armed conflict with other nations for much of the last 73 years since the end of WWII, as of 2018 the active duty force was 90% smaller than it was in 1945. That trend toward a smaller military was continuous across the Korean War, Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and the two most recent conflicts of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Though the size of the U.S. military has reduced, recognition for the influence of the service member's family on the service member has expanded. The earliest of these efforts can be traced to the Secretary of War's implementation of the private, non-profit organization Army Emergency Relief (AER) in 1942. The purpose of AER initially was just to collect funds to assist U.S. Army soldiers and families in need. The AER adopted the slogan: "Army Takes Care of Its Own." After WWII ended it was decided that AER should continue to exist to provide financial assistance, and soon enough other programs came into existence including housing assistance and healthcare benefits. By the early 1960s, military family members outnumbered service members and the U.S. Army's commitment to families led to the establishment of the Army Community Service

(ACS) program, which became an umbrella organization for managing a diverse range of family service programs.

In a 1983 White Paper, the Army Chief of Staff wrote: "A partnership exists between the Army and Army Families (p. 16)" and "The Army recognizes a moral obligation to its soldiers and their families. Because of this, soldiers and their families must be able to enjoy the benefits of the society which they are pledged to defend (p. 13).[7]" The paper references needs assessments conducted in the early 1980's which revealed that the services families most requested included employment assistance, higher quality grade schools, more youth programs, better healthcare, and improvements in quality and availability of childcare facilities. In 1985, the Department of Defense (DOD) mailed out questionnaires to service members and spouses across the Armed Forces[8,9]. The condition and functioning of the military family was believed to impact force readiness, but there was a lack of data to confirm this other than literature addressing spouse support as a significant factor in a member's decision of whether to remain in the military[10]. The 1983 White Paper had called into question whether the family readiness services offered over the previous twenty years were actually meeting family needs and whether those services were the best use of resources. In examining data from the 1985 surveys, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) posited that three variables contribute to force readiness: personnel, equipment, and training[11]. Of those three variables, personnel readiness is the one most affected by family readiness. By personnel readiness, they were referring to elements such as physical and mental health of the service member, preparedness for deployment, and motivation to serve.

The size of the active duty force was 2.15 million personnel in 1985. About 10% of personnel were female and whereas 1/3rd of enlisted identified themselves as an ethnic minority, only 1/0th of officers did. About 60% of officers were married and had children, while 43% of enlisted reported the same. U.S. service members were also young: 16% of officers and 60% of enlisted were age 25 or under. Approximately 70,000 enlisted personnel, 19,000 officers, and 44,000 spouses responded to the survey questionnaires, yielding response rates of 77% for officers, 70,% for enlisted, 71% for officer spouses, and 52% for enlisted spouses. The survey revealed some remarkable findings. Only 26% of enlisted personnel had a written will and that figure did not rise substantially higher (38%) for those enlisted personnel who were married with children. Most personnel (65% of enlisted, 70% of officers) did not prepare a power of attorney. Both of these findings should raise eyebrows in the context of military family readiness. Personnel without a written will or power of attorney put their families at great risk in the event that they are killed or an emergency occurs while the member is deployed.

Respondents identified dependent care arrangements as the biggest obstacle to readiness if they were to be unexpectedly deployed. Approximately 15% of all enlisted members reported having no dependable child care available, while 33% of spouses were dissatisfied with the quality of child care available. Additional findings concerned satisfaction of employment, housing, schooling, and services. Almost 25% of enlisted spouses and 17% of officer spouses complained of not being able to find employment. As for military housing on base, 76% of spouses described it as 'less than good.' Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) schools were rated as dissatisfactory by 20-25% of spouses. Satisfaction rates for services were the lowest

for single-parent services (21-29%), sexual assault victim counseling (32-37%), assistance for people with disabilities (38%), and child/spouse abuse counseling (43-48%). A sizable percentage of responding spouses (46% of enlisted spouses, 42% of officer spouses) rated alcohol as either 'somewhat of a problem' or 'a serious problem,' and satisfaction rates for drug/alcohol counseling were correspondingly poor (46-49%).

In 1993 the ARI reviewed over 100 scientific documents and briefings that followed the 1985 White Paper's call for further research investigating the relationship between family readiness and personnel readiness[12]. Findings from this report were: 1) unit readiness was most impacted by the extent to which soldiers felt that unit leaders supported their families, 2) soldier families who utilized family readiness programs reported stronger perceptions of support from leadership than families who did not, 3) families' difficulties in adapting to military life were reduced through support programs, 4) support from the spouse influenced retention in the service, and 5) a negative correlation was found between separation from family for duty obligations and member retention in the service. The report recommended to Army leadership that soldier retention can be increased by demonstrating support to soldier families, soldier readiness can be increased by being attentive to problems identified by soldier families, and unit readiness can be increased by engaging soldier families in unit activities.

In 2008 the U.S. Congress established the DOD Military Family Readiness Council to review and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding policies and plans of the DOD's military family readiness programs. The Council is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense and attending members include the Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Vice Chief of Staff of Naval Operations; Vice Chief of Staff, US Air Force;

Assistant Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corp; senior enlisted advisors of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps (or their wives who may attend in their absence); and members appointed from the National Military Family Association, the Tragedy Assistance Program for Survivors, and the Armed Services YMCA (Young Men's Christian Association). The Council must meet at least twice annually and provide an annual report to the Secretary of Defense and the congressional defense committees that includes 1) an assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of family readiness programs, and 2) recommendations on actions to take to ensure that these programs meet the needs of military families.

The first of these reports was submitted in December 2009[13]. Among the findings, the report cited data indicating increased stress on spouses and children, and that this was most profound for younger families. The Council determined that insufficient information was available about factors that hinder participation in family service programs. However, some of the programs received positive feedback from families: Military Family Life Consultants (MFLC), Military OneSource, and MWR (Morale, Welfare and Recreation). MFLCs are licensed mental health professionals who provide short-term counseling for a wide variety of issues including relationship distress, stress management, grief, and adjustment problems. The MFLC program started in 2007 after a two-year pilot-test that was driven by high demand for mental health services that could not be not be met with existing services. Unlike traditional mental health services in the military, visits are completely confidential and no records are kept. Moreover, visits can be held in a location convenient for the family member or service member, whether a library or coffee shop. Military OneSource, established in 2004, is a website and 24/7 call center that offers information, assistance, and referrals on practically every

aspect of military life. Through Military OneSource military families can receive financial advice, access educational and employment opportunities, prepare for duty station moves, obtain discounts on travel and entertainment, and request to speak to a counselor online, by phone, or face-to-face. MWR provides free entertainment and leisure activities to military personnel and their families. MWR also operates a variety of on-base facilities including fitness centers, pools, bowling centers, golf courses, restaurants, movie theaters, videogame arcades, conference centers, and catering businesses.

The 2016 Annual Report to the Congressional Defense Committees on the Department of Defense Policy and Plans for Military Family Readiness provides a glimpse into how far the U.S. military has come in developing and maintaining family readiness programs[14].   In 2016, the Active Duty component of the U.S. military was 1.30 million personnel[15]. Its composition has changed over the past 70 years, with 15.5% of personnel female and 31.3% identifying themselves as a minority (in 2010 the Office of Management and Budget determined that Hispanics were no longer a minority—they represented 11.8% of personnel in 2016). Military family members continued to outnumber personnel, with 641,639 spouses, 1.08 million children, and 10,268 adult dependents. Fifty-nine percent of personnel were either married, married with children, or single with children. The U.S. military was young; 72% were age 30 or below and 50.3% were age 25 or below. Spouses were also young, with 51% age 30 or younger and 26% age 25 or younger. And the military children were also young; 74% were age 11 or below, and 42% were age 5 and below.

The 2016 Annual Report assesses family readiness programs across four primary areas: 1) Children and youth, 2) Spouse education and career opportunities, 3) Financial

well-being, and 4) Personal and family life. As of 2016, the DOD was operating more than 700 Child Development Centers (CDC) in 230 locations worldwide, serving about 180,000 children daily. CDCs are on-base (or near-base) child care centers that offer full-day or part-day hourly care for children while personnel and spouses are at work or in school. These CDCs were not only meeting the demand accommodation goal of 80%, but were also hitting the quality metrics of accreditation rate (goal of 98%) and certification rate (goal of 100%). Accreditation rate refers to the percentage of CDCs that met standards of quality set by nationally-recognized accreditation bodies, while certification rate refers to the percentage of CDCs meeting DOD inspection requirements. As of 2016, the DoDEA was operating 168 grade schools in 11 countries, seven states, Guam, and Puerto Rico, serving more than 73,000 children.   Most Active Duty military children attend public or private schools in the U.S., so DoDEA schools generally cater to the children of families stationed overseas, though schools are also located near U.S. bases on the American east coast. Multiple performance-based assessments are administered to students annually to ensure that DoDEA schools are meeting standards of excellence. The DOD was also managing about 140 youth and teen centers worldwide serving more than 1 million Active Duty and Reserve Component adolescents. The purpose of these programs is to foster leadership traits, healthy life skills, physical fitness, artistic interests, and mentoring. The DOD partnered with organizations such Boys & Girls Clubs of America, Big Brothers Big Sisters, National 4-H Council, and the YMCA to provide educational and developmental programs, and the DOD runs summer camps specifically targeting children of deployed personnel to support them through the deployment cycle.

DOD created the Spouse Education and Career Opportunities Program (SECO) in 2010 to promote education and employment for military spouses. Through the Military OneSource SECO Career Center, spouses can speak with career counselors to assist them in identifying career fields that align with their skill sets, background, and goals. During 2016, SECO counselors received more than 177,000 calls from spouses. Military Spouse Employment Partnership (MSEP) was launched in 2011 to connect job seeking spouses with employers. As of 2016, more than 335 employers had pledged to recruit, hire, and train spouses. Over 5.5 million jobs had been posted to the MSEP Career Portal online, leading to 105,000 spouses receiving job offers. DOD provides MyCAA (Military Spouse Career Advancement Account) scholarships of up to $4000 to spouses for education or training. In 2016, more than 32,000 spouses set up MyCAA accounts online and more than 22,000 received scholarships.

The DOD launched the Financial Readiness Campaign in 2003 to provide financial education and promote responsible financial management. The impetus for this effort was survey data from 2002 revealing that 26% of junior level personnel (i.e., ranks of E-1 to E-4) were struggling financially and almost 35% of these personnel or their spouses either failed to make a monthly bill payment, bounced a check, obtained a high interest loan to offset expenses, or filed for bankruptcy in the previous 12 months. Financial stress can significantly impact personnel readiness. DOD-wide efforts were strengthened to teach financial literacy and encourage budgeting. Financial counselors were made readily accessible to meet with personnel. In 2006 at the urging of the DOD, Congress approved the Military Lending ACT (MLA) which authorized the federal government to protect service members from high interest lenders such as payday and vehicle title loan companies. In 2013 that authority was expanded to allow Consumer

Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to take legal action against payday and vehicle title lenders who target military personnel and their families. All of these efforts appear to have made a difference: in 2016 the same financial assessment survey administered in 2002 and annually ever since then found that 9% of junior personnel were struggling financially and 17% of junior personnel or their spouses failed to make a monthly bill payment, bounced a check, obtained a high interest loan, or filed bankruptcy within the previous 12 months.

Regarding the fourth area in the Annual Report assessing personal and family life, during 2016 Military OneSource counselors provided more than 152,000 50-minute face-to-face non-medical counseling sessions. MFLCs provided more than five million therapy sessions and briefings/presentations in 2016. MWR hosted a summer reading program at 215 of the libraries it manages around the world. That program facilitated over 38 million minutes of reading time to children during the summer of 2016. MWR libraries also offered more than 227,000 live tutoring sessions to military children. MWR provides free wireless access in base facilities worldwide to ensure that military personnel are able to maintain contact with their families when separated from them. During 2016, MWR installed wireless connectivity in on-base cafes across Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East.

The heavy emphasis the U.S. military today places on service member and family member readiness could not have been envisioned by George Washington's starving, poorly equipped men in 1777. But what about the challenged posed by the Army Chief of Staff in his 1983 White Paper? Over these last few decades of implementing family readiness programs, what have we learned about their impact on personnel readiness? In 2017 the U.S. Army's Research Facilitation Laboratory released a report that drew from 380 research articles on military family readiness published between 2007 and

2017. The conclusions from this report are clear: military family readiness programs not only make a considerable impact on the emotional, physical, social, occupational, and academic functioning of the family, but also the service member's combat readiness, interpersonal functioning within his/her unit, and mental resilience. Although this report was specific to the U.S. Army, the findings are applicable to all of the U.S. Armed Forces and their families.

References

[1]Gingrich, N., & Forstchen, W. R. (2010). *To Try men's souls: A novel of George Washington and the fight for American freedom.* New York: St. Martin's Griffin.

[2]The National WWII Museum. (n.d.). Research starters: US military by the numbers. Retrieved from https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/research-starters/research-starters-us-military-numbers.

[3]World War 2.0. (n.d.).   Married men to get draft deferment—for now. Retrieved from https://blogs.shu.edu/ww2-0/1942/06/26/married-men-to-get-draft-deferment-for-now/

[4]Khan Academy. (n.d.). American woman and World War II. Retrieved from https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/us-history/rise-to-world-power/us-wwii/a/american-women-and-world-war-ii

[5]Metropolitan State University of Denver. Women & WWII. Retrieved from

https://msudenver.edu/camphale/thewomensarmycorps/womenwwii/

[6]Michel, S. (2011). The history of child care in the U.S. *Social Welfare History Project*.

Retrieved from http://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/programs/child-care-the-

american-history/

[7]Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (1983). *White paper 1983: The Army family*. Washington,

DC: Department of the Army.

[8]McCalla, M. E., Rakoff, S. H., Doering, Z. D., & Mahoney B. S. (1986). *Description of

officers and enlisted personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces: 1985. A report based

on the 1985 DOD survey of officer and enlisted personnel.* Arlington, VA:

Defense Manpower Data Center.

[9]Griffith, J. D, Doering, Z. D., & Mahoney, B. S. (1986). *Description of spouses of

officers and enlisted personnel in the U.S. Armed Forces: 1985. A report based

on the 1985 DOD survey of officer and enlisted personnel.*   Arlington, VA:

Defense Manpower Center.

[10]Jones, A. P., & Butler, M. C. (1980). A role transition approach to the stresses of

organizationally induced family role disruption. Journal of

Marriage and the Family 42(2), 367-376.

[11]Pliske, R. M. (1988). *Families and readiness: An examination of the 1985 DOD

survey of enlisted personnel. Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

[12]Segal, M. W., & Harris, J. J. (1993). *What we know about Army families.* Alexandria,

VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

[13]Department of Defense Military Family Readiness Council (2009). Military family

readiness policy and plans for the Department of Defense for the support of

military family readiness.

[14]Department of Defense (2017). Annual Report to the Congressional Defense

Committees on the Department of Defense Policy and Plans for Military

Family Readiness.

[15]Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and

Family Policy. (2015). 2015 demographics: Profile of the military community.

[16]Hawkins, S. A., Condon, A., Hawkins, J. N., …Jackson, T. (2018). *What we know*

about military family readiness: Evidence from 2007-2017. Monterey, CA:

Research Facilitation Laboratory.

The Role of Parliament in Developing Family Support Programs for Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF)

Saya KIBA

Komatsu University, Japan

1. Introduction

In the past decade, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) has developed Family Support Programs for two possible circumstances. The first is to support families of JSDF members who are deployed abroad for Peace Support Operations (PSO). The second is to mobilize the resources of JSDF-related volunteer associations (such as veterans' associations) in order to ensure the survival of JSDF family members in the event of massive disasters in Japan's homeland.

This study hypothesizes that the Family Support Program of the JSDF has been developed through the efforts of key persons in the parliament who can be a bridge between Japanese political society and JGSDF members and their families. Through text mining of all records of the National Diet of Japan, the study shows how the JSDF family has been mentioned as a political category. First, lawmakers have proposed particular support programs for JSDF families, conveying their expectations after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, which prompted the deployment of more than 107,000 soldiers for relief efforts. Second, however, no tangible support programs related to overseas deployment for PSO have been proposed. After the 2015 Defense

Legislation Reform, lawmakers claimed that family members expect politicians to be more accountable and explain the risks in the field, while the implicit expectations of JSDF families remain unclear.

2. JSDF families *(taiin-kazoku)* and Family Support Programs

While JSDF is not a military organization under domestic laws, JSDF members and families have also experienced the same dynamics shifts indicated by Moelker (Moelker et al. 2015). Since it first dispatched its UNPKO unit to Cambodia in 1992, Japan has sent the JSDF and civilian experts to 13 UN missions through 2017 (Cabinet Office, Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters 2019). Japan has also deployed the JSDF to several non-UN missions (Indian Ocean to refuel US, British and other vessels operating in Afghanistan, and Iraq for humanitarian and engineering activities in the Samawa region). A larger part of the public is still skeptical about the use of the military in foreign countries, and such anxiety is sometimes exposed by JSDF members through media.

JSDF was established in 1954, transforming from the National Police Reserve established by the U.S. in the wake of the Korean War. Just after that, JSDF family members organized voluntary associations concurrently in different prefectures of Japan. Different groups emerged as JSDF Family Association, *Jieitai Fukei-Kai*, which was renamed as *Jieitai Kazoku-Kai* in 2015 (Jieitai Kazoku-Kai 2017). The Association organized dialogue with Japan Defense Agency, which was re-organized as Ministry of Defense in 2007. It also holds public workshop and vents to publicize JSDF activities.

However, there were little discussion on Family Support Programs in Parliament for more than a decade. Arrangement for the during-deployment support for the families whose spouses were deployed overseas for 6 months for PSO, was discussed among JSDF and Ministry of Defense. Ground Staff Office created Family Support Desk in Ichihara headquarter in 2007.

After Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, JSDF gradually shift its focus on peace-time family support. Due to the fact that more than 100,000 JSDF personnel involved in the largest-ever domestic disaster relief operation in the history of JSDF, JSDF were fully aware of growing operational needs for family support. Family Support Program is not just a welfare program to more emphasis on operational readiness and effectiveness- such idea was share among the JSDF and Ministry of Defense.

The 2014 National Defense Program Guidelines first mentioned Family Support Programs to enhance a new concept of "dynamic joint defense force," creation of tough and resilient JSDF." The guideline states that Family Support is the basis for operational effectiveness. However, as public support programs and self-help are not enough, JSDF has search for further mutual help in collaboration with civilian or veteran SDF support networks including JSDF Family Association (Kawano and Fukuura 2015).

2011 Earthquake was indeed a trigger. However, when the Family Support Program was officially discussed and launched? Is there any public debate among policy makers, JSDF members, and families? This study hypothesizes that the Family Support Program of the JSDF has been developed through the efforts of key persons in the parliament who can be a bridge between Japanese political society and JGSDF members and their families.

3. Methodology and Data-sets

The author used text mining to explore how JSDF family and the Family Support Programs were mentioned and discussed in Parliament through Digitized Parliamentary Database (*kokkai gijiroku service*, http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/), an online database of minutes of all parliamentary deliveries, both in House of Councilors and House of Representatives. The author extracted all the minutes including particular words (JSDF Family *(taiin kazoku)*, JSDF + family support, JSDF + family + disaster and read all from the context to eliminate unrelated discussions. As a result, only 26 minutes were hit as shown in Table 1.

Table 1 JSDF Family (*taiin kazoku*), JSDF + family support,
JSDF + family + disaster: 26 Hit

Year	Context	Dates and Committees
2001	Family support programs for JSDF members who join PSO	December 4 Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, House of Councilors
2004	Regarding the website of Asahikawa City, indicating family support program for JSDF members who are deployed to Iraq	February 18 Committee of Anti-terrorism and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq, Security, House of Representatives
2007	Family support programs for JSDF members who are deployed to Golan Heights	March 23 Security Committee, House of Representatives
2011	Support for family member of a JSDF soldier who died during disaster relief operation in Tohoku	April 5 Committee of Security, House of Representatives
	Sympathy to JSDF members who continue disaster relief operations while their own family members were affected by the same disaster	April 13 Committee of Legal Affairs, House of Representatives
	Needs for childcare facilities for JSDF	April 29

	members who continue disaster relief operations	Committee of Appropriation, House of Representatives
	Mental health of JSDF members who continue disaster relief operations	May 10 Committee on Health, Labor, and Welfare, House of Councilors
2013	Housing and safety assurance for JSDF families	March 7 Committee of Appropriation, House of Representatives
	Effective use of JSDF housing	December 3 Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, House of Councilors
	Effective use of JSDF housings	March 17 Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, House of Councilors
2014	Compensation for JSDF members who died in the line of duty	July 15 Committee of Appropriation, House of Councilors
	Risk management and compensation for JSDF members who died or got injured in the line of duty	February 25 Committee of Appropriation, House of Representatives
2015	Security situation in Iraq indicated in a log book	July 13 Special Committee for Defense Legislative Reform, House of Representatives
	Mental health care for JSDF families after the Defense Legislative Reform 2015	August 3 Special Committee for Defense Legislative Reform, House of Councilors
	Government's accountability to JSDF families after the Defense Legislative Reform 2015 increase of risky missions abroad	October 12 Committee of Appropriation, House of Representatives
2016	Compensation for JSDF members who died in the line of duty	February 25 Committee of Appropriation, House of Representatives
	Government accountability to JSDF families regarding security situation in South Sudan	September 29 Plenary, House of Councilors

	Government accountability to JSDF families regarding security situation in South Sudan	October 12 Committee of Appropriation, House of Representatives
	Government accountability to JSDF families regarding security situation in South Sudan	November 22 Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, House of Councilors
	Government accountability to JSDF families regarding security situation in South Sudan	November 28 Plenary, House of Councilors
2017	Government accountability to JSDF families regarding security situation in South Sudan	March 10 Committee of Security, House of Representatives
	Government accountability to JSDF families regarding security situation in South Sudan (regarding "combat" related situation in 2016)	March 14 Plenary, House of Representatives
2018	Video message of Prime Minister Abe regarding Constitutional amendment	January 24 Plenary, House of Representatives
	Compensation for JSDF members who died in helicopter accident	February 14 Committee of Appropriation, House of Representatives
	Re-employment, death benefit, and insurance for JSDF members those who are deployed abroad	March 22 Committee of Security, House of Representatives
	Security situation in South Sudan indicated in a log book	May 11 Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives

(From January 1, 1992 to October 30, 2018)

4. Analysis

1) 1992-2010

As seen in Table 2, it was only 2015 when "JSDF families (*taiin-kazoku*)" was first mentioned in the Parliament.

Table 2　JSDF families (*taiin-kazoku*): 5 hit

(From January 1, 1992 to October 30, 2018)

Year	Context	Dates and Committees
2015	Mental health care for JSDF families after the Defense Legislative Reform 2015	August 3 Special Committee for Defense Legislative Reform, House of Councilors
2016	Government accountability to JSDF families regarding security situation in South Sudan	November 22 Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, House of Councilors
	Government accountability to JSDF families regarding security situation in South Sudan	November 28 Plenary, House of Councilors
2017	Government accountability to JSDF families regarding security situation in South Sudan	March 10 Committee of Security, House of Representatives
2018	Compensation for JSDF members who died in helicopter accident	February 14 Committee of Appropriation, House of Representatives

(From January 1, 1992 to October 30, 2018)

2)　Triggered by Great East Japan Earthquake: 2011-2014

Table 3 clearly shows that, "family support" for JSDF members was hardly mentioned until the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. The word was mentioned only four times in 18 years- since 1992, when Japan started to JSDF members abroad for PSO, until 2010, just before the earthquake. Among four, concrete support programs were discussed just once in 2007, when JSDF Ground Staff Office set up Family Support Desk.

Table 3   JSDF + family support: 5 Hit

Year	Context	Dates and Committees
2001	Family support programs for JSDF members who join PSO	December 4 Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, House of Councilors
2004	Regarding the website of Asahikawa City, indicating family support program for JSDF members who are deployed to Iraq	February 18 Committee of Anti-terrorism and Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq, Security, House of Representatives
2007	Family support programs for JSDF members who are deployed to Golan Heights	March 23 Security Committee, House of Representatives
2015	Security situation in Iraq indicated in a log book	July 13 Special Committee for Defense Legislative Reform, House of Representatives
2018	Security situation in South Sudan indicated in a log book	May 11 Committee of Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives

(From January 1, 1992 to October 30, 2018)

However, members of the parliament start mentioning JSDF families in relation to disaster relief activities after March 11, 2011. Just after a Staff Sargent who was engaged in relief operation passed away on April 1, a congressman from Liberal Democrat Party asked Ministry of Defense about rotation system and mental health care of the JSDF members.

On April 13, Congressman Kiuchi, who visited Matsushima Airbase, which was severely damaged by disaster, first mentioned the fact that JSDF members also lost their own family. On April 29, Hashimoto, a representative from disaster-affected Miyagi Prefecture, disclosed a story he heard from Gen. Kimizuka, Commander of the North

Eastern Army who led Joint Task Force - Tohoku, a massive 100,000 soldier relief effort coordinated with American forces in *Operation Tomodachi*. Kimizuka told Hashimoto that JSDF members have hard time to look for childcare facilities while they leave home for months for relief operation- particularly in case that couples are both in active duty. Minister Kitazawa, then answered that the Ministry prepared childcare facilities inside the camp, and will increase budget for family support.

It was May 10 when mental health of JSDF members and families was first discussed.

In 2014, Councilor Uto, upper house member and retired air captain, mentioned that around 480 JSDF members lost their families but had to continue the operation. He insisted that the JSDF housing was a base to encourage self-help efforts among the JSDF families during that time. Another upper house member Sato, former commander of the 1st Iraqi Reconstruction Support Unit, questioned to Prime Minister Abe, about death benefit, compensation, and awarding.

While total hours of discussion were not very long, it is notable that, 2011 Earthquake triggered comprehensive discussion of JSDF's family support programs including concrete measures for mental health, housing, childcare, and even sensitive issues such as death benefit.

3) **Icon of "lack of accountability?" After 2015 Defense Legislative Reform**

"JSDF family" is mentioned in different context after 2015.

Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet passed a Cabinet resolution in 2014 to allow the JSDF to take action in support of the US when the ally comes under attack. The bill to

legalize such mobilization of the SDF, the controversial security legislation (*ampo hosei*) was submitted to the parliament in 2015. The bill approved by the parliament on September 19 after 4-month debate and massive demonstration against the move. After the passage of the bill, opposition lawmakers often mentioned JSDF families as an icon of uncertain future risk of JSDF, anxiety of the nationals, and lack of government accountability.

For instance, on September 29 2016, upper house member Ichida of Communist Party of Japan mentioned security risk in South Sudan. "There is no more reason why JSDF join the UN-PKO mission South Sudan, where there is ongoing conflict. The government… JSDF families says it drives them crazy to consider their sons join the war. They never forgive Prime Minister Abe for sacrificing their sons and daughters. How do you answer them, Prime Minister?"

On March 10, 2017, Congressman Masuta criticized Minister of Defense, for not disclose security information in South Sudan. He read out voices from JSDF families in his own constituency quoted in a local newspaper article "JSDF families distrust the government."

5. Conclusion

There is a consensus among JSDF members- both officers and noncommissioned officers- that there is high needs for Family Support Programs not as a welfare program, but to enhance defense effectiveness after 2011 earthquake. The analysis above makes clear that lawmakers have proposed and discussed concrete measures how to officially support JSDF families. Such concern was widely shared beyond political parties.

Lawmakers who has experience in JSDF played particularly important roles to deliver sensitive issues such as death compensation.

On the other hand, however, no tangible support programs related to overseas deployment for PSO have been proposed. After the 2015 Defense Legislation Reform, lawmakers claimed that family members expect politicians to be more accountable and explain the risks in the field, while the implicit expectations of JSDF families remain unclear.

Mentioning risk of death in PSO is still a big taboo in Japan. Changing this situation seems to depend on whether and to what degree the Japanese population can accommodate the nature of JSDF not as a disaster relief organization, but as a defense force which plays a crucial role in the international political environment of today.

However, this study suggests that the public opinion and parliamentary debate on JSDF is not always staunch. Unexpected events can eventually encourage public debate on risk, death, and support programs. Such discussion is becoming ever more important and thus necessary in Japan. Improving the well-being of JSDF members and solving issues in recruitment and retention, and care for military families will prove key in developing the militaries and security for the foreseeable future.

References

Carreiras, Helena. and Celso Castro. (2012) *Qualitative Methods in Military Studies: Research Experiences and Challenges*. Routledge.

Forster, Anthony. (2006) "Breaking the Covenant: Governance of the British Armine the Twenty-First Century," *International Affairs* 82(6): 1043-57.

Fukuura, Atsuko. (2012) *Getting Involved: Relocation, Overseas deployment and Spouse clubs for Japan Self Defense officers*. Working Paper Series，Faculty of Economics, Shiga University, No. 173.

Jieitai Kazoku Kai. (2017) *40-years history of JSDF Family Association.* (original in Japanese: 自衛隊家族会（2017）『公益社団法人自衛隊家族会 40 年史』)

Kawano, Hithoshi. and Atsuko Fukuura. (2015) "Family support and the Japan Self-Defense Forces: Challenges and developing new programs," in Moelker, Rene. et al. eds. *Military Families and War in the 21st Century: Comparative perspectives.* Routledge.

Levy, Yagil. (2003) "Social Convertibility and Militarism: Evaluations of the Development of the Military-Society Relations in Israel in the early 2000s." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology.* 31(1): pp.71-96.

———. 2010. "How the Military's Social Composition Affects Political Protest: The Case of Israel." *Peace & Change.* 35 (1). pp.123-145.

Lomsky-Feder, Edna. and Ben-Ari, E. (2013) "Managing Diversity in Context: Unit Level Dynamics in the Israel Defense Forces," *Armed Forces & Society*. 39(2): 193–212.

Martinsen, Kåre Dahl. (2013): *Soldier Repatriation*. Ashgate.

Segal. Mady Wechsler. (1986) "The Military and the Family As Greedy Institutions," *Armed Forces & Society*. Vol. 13, Issue 1.

Moelker, Rene. et al. eds. (2015) *Military Families and War in the 21st Century: Comparative perspectives.* Routledge.

Preparing for family support for (future) deaths in the Japan Self-Defense Force — Learning from the German Experiences

Atsushi Yasutomi[1]

Miyazaki International College / Japan

1. Introduction

Japan has yet to experience any combat-related casualties amongst the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) during missions abroad including the United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) and other peace support operations.[2]

Legal reforms in 2015 expanded the scope of JSDF missions beyond their conventional engineering functions, enabling JSDF soldiers, for example, to approach and fight local armed groups to rescue Japanese nationals as well as military personnel from other countries participating in UNPKO. Accordingly, the 2015 reforms have relaxed restrictions on the JSDF's use of weapons during missions abroad.

[2] One soldier from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force died in a traffic accident during the joint military exercise among the US, the Philippines, and Japan on 2 October 2018, making it the first instance of a JSDF soldier dying abroad (*Kyodo*, 18 December 2018). However, as it was a traffic accident, this case, though it was the first such case outside Japan for the JSDF, will not be considered as a combat-related death.

Since its withdrawal from UNMISS in May 2017, Japan has not sent JSDF troops to UNPKO.[3] At this point, no specific plan is being made for deployment to UNPKO missions in the imminent future. Risks of military casualties in UNPKO have diminished for the time being. Still, the risk of combat-related casualties remains, as Japan has deployed a nearly 400-member strong unit to Djibouti for anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden, including air patrol and vessel escorting activities near the Somali coast.[4] Future PKO deployment is also possible.

Under these circumstances, the JSDF has yet to be ready to accept and honour combat-related casualties amongst the JSDF soldiers from a number of aspects, including legal frameworks and protocols for honouring such deaths.[5] This article argues that the same is true for the current family support systems for the same purpose and that a number of experiences can be learnt from the practices in the German Federal Armed Force (*Bundeswehr*). To this end, this paper will examine the *Bundeswehr*'s services and support systems for the soldiers and their families that are directly and indirectly associated with the loss of soldiers during missions abroad.

---

[3] Since the withdrawal from the UNMISS mission in May 2017, Japan has dispatched two staff officers to UNMISS for one-year routines. See, Cabinet Office of Japan, <http://www.pko.go.jp/pko_e/pko_main_e.html> (last access on 10 January 2019).

[4] The base was set up in the northwestern section of Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport in June 2011. The JSDF leased the land for the mission from the Republic of Djibouti. See, Ministry of Defense at < http://www.mod.go.jp/e/jdf/no23/topics01.html> (last accessed on 10 January 2019). The base can also be used for temporary shelter for Japanese nationals in times of crisis, as it was used for accommodating a few Embassy staff evacuated from Juba, South Sudan, when the security deteriorated in July 2016. See, "Japan to expand SDF base in tiny but strategically important Djibouti", *The Japan Times*, 19 November 2017.

[5] Atsushi Yasutomi, "Combat-related Death of Soldiers and Public Support for Military Missions Abroad: a case of Japan", *Comparative Culture,* Miyazaki International College, 2009, forthcoming.

2. Literature review

There are few (if not at all) theoretical studies on military families directly associated with deaths of soldiers. The following two sets of studies, however, help us understand the relationship between the two.

The first set of studies discuss the significance of the presence of legitimacy of military death amongst the public. The scholars in this field argue that, in order to overcome and justify deaths of soldiers who lost their lives during their contribution to international peace, there must be a strong sense of legitimacy over deaths of soldiers both within the military and amongst the members of the society.

Ben-Ari focuses on the social rites following combat deaths. He argues that a "good death" can achieve legitimisation through a symbolic victory over the sense of meaninglessness and helplessness associated with a soldier's loss in combat.[6] Ben-Ari claims that public acceptance hinges on retrieving the body, an official (and/or military) commemoration accompanied by informal rites of remembering, and psychological care for the families and next-of-kin left behind.[7] By providing public and official rites to commemorate fallen soldiers, the deaths become social deaths—they become the subjects of public mourning and political discourses. This process demonstrates to the public that the soldiers are granted the military organisation's respect. It honours the soldiers' ultimate commitment to serving their community and symbolises that the military organisation remains committed to the individuals in death as well as in life.[8] For Ben-

---

[6] Eyal Ben-Ari, "Epilogue: A 'good' military death," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 4, Summer 2005, pp. 651-664.

[7] Ibid., p. 660.

[8] Ibid.

Ari, even the minutia surrounding the handling of soldiers' deaths—the ceremonies, burials, funeral, family support, psychological care, and administrative compensation— helps cement the effect of a "good death." Furthermore, they help to restore the military organisation's legitimacy, as well as troop morale and cohesion, after they are tarnished by the loss of soldiers' lives.[9]

In their article, "Casualties and Civil-Military Relations: The German Polity between Learning and Indifference," Kümmel and Leonhard analyse the *Bundeswehr*'s casualties during out-of-area missions since 1992.[10] During 15 years of military missions abroad, the *Bundeswehr* has suffered a total of 108 soldiers killed (including those killed in accidents and exchanges of fire). Kümmel and Leonhard observe that Germany has experienced social learning while justifying the deaths of soldiers engaged in specific missions. They also argue that functional indifference—a corroborated sign of social learning—has increased over the years even though deaths of soldiers continue during its foreign missions. Over time, the "functionally indifferent" public pay less attention to information (particularly in the media) on soldiers' deaths. In modern Germany, they find, the public has taken the position that the death of soldiers is largely a concern for political actors and the military, not the society as a whole.[11] For social learning (and functional indifference) to be present, they conclude, an unquestionable sense of the legitimacy of the military mission must be fostered in the public. In other words, the public must feel

---

[9] Ibid., p. 661.

[10] Gerhard Kümmel and Nina Leonhard, "Casualties and Civil-Military Relations: The German Polity between Learning and Indifference," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 4, Summer 2005, pp. 513-516.

[11] Ibid., p. 530.

that it is adequately informed and agree with the proposition that meeting international peacekeeping responsibilities may lead to the loss of lives.[12]

These scholars do not necessarily mention family support in relation to the legitimacy of soldiers' death, however, the discussions can be understood in the way that sufficient family support needs to be present and functioning in order to reach the point where the strong sense of legitimacy becomes solidified and well-established both in the military and the society. The fact that there is a strong sense of legitimacy can also be understood as the reflection from the military and the society that sufficient and functioning family support structures were present. In this way, family support could be understood both as the condition for and the consequence of such legitimacy.

Another set of literature is a case study of JSDF families. The scholars in this field commonly emphasize the vivid lack of practical structure for family support, particularly for the military wives, and thus alerting that such a system needs to be strengthened.

Atsuko Fukuura (2012) contributed another perspective in her 2012 article "Getting Involved: Relocation, Overseas deployment and Spouse Clubs for Japan Self Defense Officers." Fukuura sheds light on the wives of JSDF soldiers, presenting ethnographic details about a number of spouses of soldiers serving abroad, with a focus on the JSDF's informal dimensions of assistance (in addition to the institutional support provided) to military families.

In her article, "Ambiguous Positioning of Military Wives: Exclusion and Reliance Techniques in Japan," Atsuko Fukuura (2017), based on her interviews with a number of

---

[12] Ibid.

wives of JSDF members, analyses the relations with their husbands experiencing mental health issues suffered during the services.

The issue of mental health in relation to the military and society is also studied in detail by Hitoshi Kawano (2013). His article, "Studies in clinical sociology on the JSDF's Overseas Activities", compares the US, UK, and Japanese systems for mental health treatment for the soldiers and their military families serving abroad. He argues that, while some US and UK examples should be learnt and followed, more extensive measures are necessary to accommodate the specific circumstances suited to the JSDF requirements.

Although the scholars of military families above do not directly touch upon the issue of deaths of soldiers, their unanimous warnings to the readers of the permanent and constant absence of family support in general imply that family support structure for deaths of soldiers needs to be also strengthened likewise.

3. The *Bundeswehr*'s experiences

The rationale for studying German experiences

This section argues that many of the experiences and practices in the *Bundeswehr* can be learnt for preparation for Japan's family support in case of deaths in overseas missions. The rationales for examining the German cases are at least four-fold. First, since its establishment in 1955, the *Bundeswehr* has gone through democratisation after WWII and has committed itself to building its democratic armed forces that actively contribute to international peace and stability. Secondly, as in the case in Japan, after some controversies in the Parliament, Germany sent the *Bundeswehr* to its first UNPKO

mission to Cambodia in 1992, conducting engineering activities such as repairing roads and buildings. The stark difference is that the Bundeswehr experienced its first casualty amongst the members in UNPKO. Military casualties continued in the Bundeswehr's activities in its UNPKO and other out-of-area missions and the total of deaths of soldiers — including combat-related deaths as well as accidents and suicides — reached 108 to date (table 1), whereas Japan has experienced no casualties in foreign missions. Forth, as will be examined below, there are a variety of support systems offered directly and indirectly to the families that experienced or have any concerns of death (or any kind of anxieties and stresses) of soldiers during their deployment outside Germany.

• **Suicides**		22
• Afghanistan	**Combat-Related**	**35**
	Other	21
• Kosovo		27
• Bosnia & Hercegovina		19
• Mali		2
• Cambodia		1
• Georgia		1
• Iraq		1
• Adriatic Sea		1
• **Total**		**108**

Table 1. Number of soldiers' death in the Bundeswehr's missions abroad (source: the Bundeswehr 2017)

German Armed Forces Centre for Military Mental Health (*Psychotrauma Centre*)[13]

The Trauma Centre is a part of the Military Hospital[14] (*Bundeswehrkrankenhaus*) which belongs to the Ministry of Defense. The Pscyhotrauma Centre hosts several effective programmes for psychological support for the Bundeswehr soldiers deployed to

---

[13] This section is based on the author's interviews with the psychologists, psychiatrists, and other mental health programme officers at the German Armed Forces Centre for Military Mental Health, Berlin, 2 May 2018. The information in this section is also based upon the unpublished manuscripts delivered at the time of the interviews mentioned above. These include the following: Antje Bühler, "Parallel Process: In case of death or wounded soldiers", Bundeswehrkrankenhaus Berlin , 2 May 2018; Ulrich Wesemen, "Psychological Fitness", Bundeswehrkrankenhaus Berlin, 2 May 2018; Ulrich Wesemen, "Evaluation of a Technology-based Adaptive Learning and Prevention Program for Stress Response – Charly" Bundeswehrkrankenhaus Berlin, 2 May 2018; and Gerd Willmund, "Deployment Related Disorders: Treatment/Research Approaches", Bundeswehrkrankenhaus Berlin, 2 May 2018.

[14] <http://www.sanitaetsdienst-bundeswehr.de/> (last accessed on 15 January 2019)

foreign missions and their family members. It conducts programmes in each of the pre-deployment, post-deployment, as well as during the deployment to foreign countries.

Technology-based PTSD prevention programme for pre-deployment soldiers

Amongst its pre-deployment programmes is the technology-based prevention of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other psychological problems for soldiers. A software specifically designed for this service named "Charly" can identify soldiers who are more likely to have potential risks of psychological problems such as PTSD in the future out-of-area missions. "Charly" contains games and virtual reality programmes that emulate real-time combat and other difficult situations that require the soldiers' stressful reactions.[15] The programme shows the soldiers' some stressful photos that were actually taken during the past foreign missions, including the scenes in fire-exchange combat, dead bodies, a number of wounded civilians and soldiers covered in blood and their body parts violently damaged. It also contains other stress moments such as the one in which they are being placed in a tense patrol duty at the frontline and the one in which their unit companion is being killed in front of them. The Centre used it for the soldiers scheduled to be deployed to Afghanistan under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for six months.

Group consultation on "Why go, why not go"

Another service provided by the Psychotrauma Centre is a psychological consultation with soldiers to be deployed abroad. Such soldiers typically ask themselves questions regarding the rationale for serving overseas and their family issues. The Centre reveals

---

[15] Author's interview, Trauma Centre, Military Hospital, Berlin, 2 May 2018.

that their common consultation topic is not simply that they are preoccupied with their family members and partners left behind during their foreign service, but rather that they often contemplate the real value in serving abroad while sacrificing their loved ones behind with risk of damaging the relationship with them. The Centre also offers consultations for those who have declined to serve foreign missions for various personal reasons (e.g. family and health issues). They come to discuss whether their decision to decline was correct as they sometimes find themselves guilty albeit their fully legitimate excuses.

During deployment, the Centre dispatches military psychologists in the deployed units making them accessible for any time necessary. The Centre has a standard protocol in case of soldiers' death and serious wound. The Centre has an agreement with the media to hold at least for the first two hours before any broadcast of news about deaths and serious wound of soldiers. This is to prevent the news from reaching their family members prior to first formal incident reports directly to their family from the unit. Another characteristic feature about the Centre's protocol is cooperation with the military police. The military police together with the Centre produce investigative reports detailing the causes and processes of the death of soldiers at a particular scene in the mission field. Such reports are useful not solely for the incident accountability purpose but also for the Centre's consultation services at a post-deployment stage. The Centre also explains that, in the event of deaths or severe wound, the surviving companion soldiers typically ask themselves their personal responsibilities for the event and feel guilty for any of their mistakes they might have made even in the (most) cases in which the events have no direct causal relations.

Post-deployment face-to-face consultations play vital roles for the soldiers that have experienced difficulties in the mission theatres. Those that the Centre consulted so far include a driver affected by improvised explosive devises (IED) in Afghanistan where the blast killed his team member. The Centre also explains that a military medical officer who once suffered from the psychological difficulties after facing a combat situation in Afghanistan decided to return to his Afghan mission after its psychological consultation at this Centre.

Tour to the site where soldiers fell

Another essential support provided by the Centre is a "tour" to the location of the death of soldiers. The Centre escorts, if any request is placed, family members and partners of the deceased soldiers to the site of the mission where the soldiers lost their lives. By using the information collected during the aforementioned incident report, the Centre details to the family as to exactly where and how the death occurred. This kind of tour already took place in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The psychologists in the Centre unanimously agree that this activity has proven highly effective for the bereaved family members to accept the deaths by actually experiencing and sharing the time and place posthumously, through which they gradually absorb and understand the reality of the tragedy. For this reason, the Centre is to continue with this programme for future missions abroad.

Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre (Zentrum Innere Führung)[16]

The Leadership Development and Civil Education Centre (*Zentrum Innere Führung*) was first established in 1957 and has been relocated in Koblenz since 1981.[17] This centre (hereafter "ZIF") hosts a number of training and educational programmes aimed at developing military discipline, philosophy, and integration, to better serve the state and the society. Each year the ZIF hosts more than 250 seminars and events designed to develop soldiers' ethics, leadership, philosophy, and disciplines, in which a total of 12,000 soldiers visit and learn annually (figure 1). The ZIF also offers various support programmes related to deaths of soldiers in overseas missions.

The ZIF hosts a programme to provide a license to be a "peer", a status in the Bundeswehr soldiers of a consulting "mate" for other soldiers of pre- and post-deployment as well as during their deployment. The license lasts five years and can be renewed upon re-training. The "peers" are often met by their fellow

Figure 1. "Peer" leadership training programme. Source: Zentrum Innere Führung, 2017.

soldiers before and after the foreign deployment for consultations on common topics such as risks of marital relationships, legal procedures required to take long-term leaves of absence from the service. The "peers" also organise group consultations with those soldiers feel necessary particularly after the foreign deployment, called Post-Deployment Seminars (PDS). Distinct from the specialised consultation provided by the above-

---

[16] This section is based on the author's interview and unpublished manuscripts published at the Leadership Development and Civic Education Centre (Zentrum Innere Führung), Koblenz, Germany, 3 March 2018.

[17] Its local offices are located in Hamburg and Strausberg.

mentioned Psychotrauma Centre, the PDS is held in a more relaxed, open atmosphere to encourage freer exchanges of feelings and ideas. The common topic brought by the post-deployed soldiers is the question about the meaning and value of their service away from home. They typically start asking, "What was our deployment about anyway?" It is important, the officers in the ZIF emphasises, that these soldiers never talk about these issues to their family members, but they do so actively when they gather around the "peers" who had experienced through the same or similar challenges. It is thus crucial for the post-deployed soldiers to have such opportunities and spew out their inner emotions, questions, concerns and frustrations and share with other colleagues under the leadership of the "peers".

United Nations Training Centre for the Bundeswehr (*Vereinte Nationen Ausbildungszentrum der Bundeswehr*)[18]

The United Nations Centre for the *Bundeswehr* (*Vereinte Nationen Ausbildungszentrum der Bundeswehr*) (hereafter "UNTCB") is located at Hammelberg, Bavaria, and is a multinational training facility centre for pre-deployment soldiers to missions abroad. The UNTCB is specialised in providing these actors with practical, action-based training particularly in hostile circumstances in foreign missions. Due to the very nature of the purpose of this training centre, there are a number of programmes directly related to deaths of soldiers particularly during combat in missions abroad.

Hostile environment awareness training

First, the UNTCB offers hostile environment awareness training not only to the *Bundeswehr* soldiers but also to other civilians such as the police, journalists, government

---

[18] This section is based on the author's interviews at the United Nations Training Centre for the Bundeswehr, 4 May 2018.

officers, and non-governmental organisation workers. This training gives them opportunities of being placed under heavy fire exchanges and being taken hostage by a militant group and trains how to survive in such hostile situations. It also provides training on landmine awareness, surveillance techniques, and patrolling skills. The training serves opportunities for civilians, particularly journalists, to be more familiar with hostile and combat situations through which the participants come to have more understandings about the details of the deployed soldiers' procedures particularly in a crisis case. An officer reveals that journalists who attended this training tend not to make groundless criticisms about the military particularly in the events of soldiers' death or wound, while others easily question the responsibility for the Bundeswehr's appropriate actions to prevent tragic events.

Body-undertaking course

Another characteristic training that the UNTCB offers is a body-undertaking course. It is a 10-day voluntary participating class — open to any interested soldiers from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Military Police — and contains training subjects such as corpse hygienic care, body transportation, legal issues involving undertaking, and stress control for handling corpse and wounded (figure 2). It uses both photographic images as well as real corpses. The actual undertaking classes are held in cooperation with a private

Figure 2. Tools used for body-undertaking processes. Source: United Nations Training Centre for the Bundeswehr, 2017.

Figure 3. Tools used for body-undertaking processes. Source: United Nations Training Centre for the Bundeswehr, 2017.

Figure 4. Coffins ready to be shipped to the Bundeswehr's mission areas. Source: United Nations Training Centre for the Bundeswehr, 2017.

undertaking and funeral academy on an annual contract basis. Bodies are leased and offered voluntarily from the families wishing to contribute to the UNTCB so that the trainees are able to feel the authentic touch, smell, and other feelings in handling the dead bodies. They also learn how to lay the corpse into a coffin after implementing hygienic and cosmetic treatment (figure 3). An undertaking trainer explains that the course evolved from the past mistake where the *Bundeswehr* soldiers found themselves without even coffins, equipment and knowledge of treating and transporting four fallen soldiers in Afghanistan back to Germany. This course also teaches how to prepare so-to-speak a "go pack" where every unit needs to carry for preparation of deaths of soldiers when they are deployed abroad. This package typically contains coffins in which necessary items such as a flag, helmet, and easel are stored. (figure 4).

Apart from the technical perspective, the significance of this specific course is manifold. First, during the practice, some soldiers get to know their personal psychological limit to which they can handle corpses (which by no means failure to this course). This helps identify those who are and those who are not capable of facing the dead. This trainer explains that it is an important process for the soldiers to understand and accept deaths in their own term either by being able or not being able to confront the treatment of the corpse. Second, through the exercise, the participating soldiers could develop a feeling of integrity and a kind of "buddy" spirit. This means that they begin to feel they will treat their colleague's remain if something happened to him/her. Third, their undertaking skill helps develop trust with the communities of the mission theatre. Several German soldiers deployed in Afghanistan treated a deceased child, who was a son of a governor, which resulted in building good cooperative relations with the German forces later. Finally and more importantly, the undertaking skills can eventually protect the soldiers themselves from the families of the dead soldiers and the media when any kinds of misunderstandings and accidents were involved.

Military chaplaincy[19]

Approximately 100 Roman Catholic priests and 75 Protestant pastors are registered as a military chaplain in the *Bundeswehr*. This means there is at least one chaplain is available for every 1,700 soldiers. The *Bundeswehr* chaplains are deployed in every mission abroad; 2 were sent to Afghanistan, and one deployed to Mali. With regards to death of soldiers, chaplains' roles include pre-deployment discussions on being killed and

---

[19] This section is based on the author's interview with a Bundeswehr chaplain, Berlin, 22 August 2017.

killing. The discussions do not necessarily relate to theological, but the pre-deployment soldiers are given opportunities to talk freely. Nevertheless, pre-deployment consultations and discussions with chaplains usually tend to focus on such topics as family issues and partners. The deployed embedded chaplains in the mission fields are not given any military rank so that the soldiers from any ranks feel comfortable to approach.

In the event of death of soldiers, chaplains are required to arrive at the site of the incident before the arrival of the media and other civilians outside the military. While the most significant share of the military chaplains' roles in this incident is to organise and conduct memorial services in the mission area as well as in Germany, equally important is the post-funeral grief care for the families. According to a military chaplain, most of the colleagues of the deceased soldier hardly talk about their grief and other emotions partly because they believe doing so is considered to be weak. Nevertheless, they do begin to expose their emotions when they gather in a small group for this purpose organised by a military chaplain purposely dressed in a civilian costume. This chaplain evaluates that this is another important and necessary step for the surviving soldiers to understand and overcome the deaths of fellow soldiers. The chaplains also provide some practical suggestions and requests to the Bundeswehr based on their experiences in treating the dead. For example, the chaplains observed a number of media groups rushed to the airport when the coffin of the first casualty arrived from the Cambodian mission, photographing and video-taking the arrival of the remain and interviewing the families. Witnessing these events too disturbing to the bereaved families, the chaplains requested the *Bundeswehr* to isolate the media in this specific moment and give a separate occasion for official interview sessions in the absence of the devastated family members.

<u>Ombudsman group</u>[20]

Approximately 60 ombudsmen are working as "parliamentary commissioners" in the ombudsman group for the *Bundeswehr*. The group was set up to safeguard the interests and the rights of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers. It receives various complaints and requests from any Bundeswehr soldiers — COs or NCOs, regardless of their service areas — for any issues concerning the soldiers' work and living environment in missions inside and outside the country. The complaints and requests are often equipment-related. The Ombudsman group receives approximately 6,000 such complaints annually. Some serious cases include those that alarm that the field soldiers are told to use badly maintained equipment due to budget constraint causing severe safety issues in the field. The ombudsman group may dispatch an investigative tour to the site of the incidents and problems in mission field outside Germany. The Ombudsman's parliamentary commissioners are required to produce an annual report which is to be publicised on the internet openly. Further, they are given authority to speak in the national parliament. Based on the reports, the commissioners are given authority not only to inform as well as question the Defense Minister and other related ministers in the parliamentary hearings.

While most of the concerns are related to technical issues such as difficulties of aircraft spare parts in meeting NATO standard, some complaints on the serving conditions in foreign missions proved to increase the safety of the soldiers. The Ombudsman group found that tanks and other equipment used in the earlier missions in the Balkans were not re-painted appropriately to match the desert in Afghanistan, increasing the risk of the soldiers being exposed to armed groups. Also, a complaint was

---

[20] This section is based on the author's interview with the members of the ombudsman group, Berlin, 21 August 2017.

placed to the Ombudsman group on the use of unarmed military convoy bus for the deployed soldiers in Afghanistan when it was severely attacked by a terrorist group, causing four deaths of soldiers and 31 injuries. The complaint was not only about the quality of the convoy bus itself but also about the unit's overconfidence of the German unit that it believed it won sufficient local trust from the residents that led to perceive a terrorist attack unlikely.

Military Union (*Deutscher Bundeswehr Verband*)[21]

The purpose of the military union for the Bundeswehr soldiers is to protect their work-related rights. With regards to death of soldiers, the Union's role has caught many soldiers' attention when the first soldiers lost their lives in the foreign missions in Cambodia and Afghanistan since the Union assisted their families in many aspects. First, the Union helped the families with a number of necessary legal issues necessary to receive insurance and other financial compensation. The Union also lobbied to the Ministries of Defense and of Finance for legal reforms for support for the surviving families. Moreover, it also lobbied the Ministry of Defense to expand more opportunities for the soldiers who seriously injured (e.g. amputated soldiers) during the foreign missions but wish to continue serving in the military. Further, it also assisted in defending the surviving soldiers and families from the series of media inquiries and interviews after the death incidents in the mission field that negligently seek personal accusations over the incident.

---

[21] This section is based on the author's interview with the members of the Military Union in charge of public relations, Berlin, 21 August 2017.

<u>The Bundeswehr Museum of Military History</u>[22]

There are two Bundeswehr military museums in Germany: one is located in Dresden and the other in Gatow near Berlin. The former exhibits a number of collections related to the loss of the Bundeswehr soldiers during foreign missions starting from Cambodia in 1993. It exhibits materials including uniform worn by the fallen soldiers, damaged vehicles (real object) by bombs, diaries and personal letters, the chalice and corporal used for the on-site ceremony conducted by the military chaplain, together with a number of photos demonstrating the damages of the attack when the fallen soldiers were involved (figure 5). It also displays near-real human body wax effigies in various combat fields emulating the soldiers' injuries leading to death.


Figure 5. Two examples from the exhibitions at the Bundeswehr Museum of Military History. Missal tools used at the on-site ceremony (left), Vehicle attacked in Afghanistan mission (right) Source: Bundeswehr Museum of Military History

The curator, who himself served in the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, explains that the exhibiting articles are either donated or borrowed from the bereaved families in the hope that museum visitors could feel more directly by looking at the items left behind the fallen soldiers and better understand what it means to lose soldiers' life in the military. The same curator also reveals that military families often visit the museum to remember

---

[22] This section is based on the author's interviews with curators and archivists, at Bundeswehr Museum of Military History, Berlin-Gatow, 8 March 2017, and at Bundeswehr Museum of Military History, Dresden, 18 August 2017. The details of the Museum can be seen at its official website at <www.mhmbw.de/> (last access on 1 January 2019).

the dead. Other curators emphasise the significance of the military museum, particularly the one in Dresden, in the context of family support for deaths of soldiers. The museum has a solid exhibiting policy of intentionally uncovering all possible exhibitions of articles related to the past deaths of the *Bundeswehr* soldiers so as to provide opportunities for the visitors to ask themselves about each incident and the values of the soldiers' contribution. They point out that the Military Museums play a role of projecting important questions to the society about the significance — whatever the visitors' political orientations may be — of the *Bundeswehr*'s contribution to international peace and that contribution often accompanies human costs.

Forest of Remembrance (*Der Walt der Erinnerung*)[23]

The Forest of Remembrance (*Der Walt der Erinnerung*) is located in Potsdam and is a part of the *Bundeswehr* facility specifically dedicated to all who died during the *Bundeswehr*'s missions abroad. The Forest is situated in a remote area, giving a spacious and quiet atmosphere. The facility is not a cemetery but a place for personal mourning open to the public in general. It consists of several sections including the one in which cenotaphs are erected that specify the names of the fallen soldiers and the mission, and the one displaying photos of the on-site memorial services for the fallen soldiers (figure 6). Another unique site in this Forest is that a portion of the grove is open to the bereaved families where they are allowed to designate one specific tree and decorate with items of personal memories such as the soldier's nameplate, photo, flowers, and personal messages, nailed to the tree (figure 7). A *Bundeswehr* officer in charge of the Forest explains that

---

[23] This section is based on the author's interview at Der Walt der Erinnerung, 22 August 2017.

the surviving families pay a regular visit to the Forest, particularly to the specific tree. He adds that official visits from both German and foreign militaries and other guests are held in this Forest in commemoration of the soldiers who lost their lives during the missions abroad. The same officer emphasises that the Forest is one of the significant places for the bereaved families that provides them with direct, personal, and emotional contacts

Figure 6. One of the cenotaphs with the names, mission of the fallen soldiers inscribed (left), Photos displaying the death incidents in the missions abroad. Source: Der Walt der Erinnerung, photographed by the author

Figure 7. Trees decorated by the bereaved military families in remembrance of the fallen soldiers. Source: Der Walt der Erinnerung, photographed by the author

with their loved ones where they can re-recognise the value of the soldiers' life contribution to the missions. The designated tree also has specific significance for the families as the tree is personifying their loved one that symbolises his/her attachment to the *Bundeswehr* as a significant contributor yet resting in the tranquil nature.

<u>Community Family Support Centres</u>

There are 31 Community Family Support Centres throughout Germany. This centre provides support for the military families particularly where their family member is being deployed outside Germany. More than 90% of such families join the centre's network. Each centre is typically staffed by two commanders and three civilians with some experiences in the military. Its typical support activities include such activities as weekend BBQ, visit to a local zoo, and information-sharing on community events. It also shares basic information about the whereabouts of the mission fields where their member soldiers are being deployed. The families are given opportunities to learn basic knowledge about the field information, living and service conditions of the soldiers in the field.

In any event of death of soldiers, this centre assists, if requested, in preparing ceremony arrangements, such as decorations, cascades, photos, and other equipment necessary for both military and civilian funerals. The centre also helps coordinate grief consultations with a local military chaplain and civilian counsellors. Often appreciated assistance is financial support temporarily necessitated for funeral and post-funeral arrangements for the bereaved families. Another assistance that has proven efficient and helpful by the surviving soldiers and families is that of offering links to a civilian PTSD and other psychological counsellors for those who have mental challenges after the deadly event. The surviving soldiers and families often find themselves difficult to arrange consultations with military psychologists as they are often occupied. For this reason, the centres keep available information network for psychologists and other mental clinics and counsellors who could well-suit this specific case.

4. Conclusion

Japan has yet to prepare itself for treating deaths of soldiers in missions abroad, particularly for the ones fallen during combat-related incidents in the future. The existing literature related to military death suggests that inadequate understanding of soldiers' sacrifice amongst the public leads to a decline for public support for missions abroad, particularly for combat-related tasks in out-of-area missions. The existing studies also suggest that support for military families in Japan faces constant short of services and thus requires urgent improvements. Under these circumstances, Japan needs to prepare itself for establishing family support services in case of any death incidents in foreign missions. A number of such practices and services can be learnt from the *Bundeswehr*.

First, the German experiences offer opportunities for the soldiers to enhance their own understandings of deaths and sacrifice in a foreign mission. Individual as well as group consultations and discussions specifically designated for this purpose allow them to explore and develop their own philosophical, spiritual, and psychological dimensions of military deaths. The Psychotrauma Centre's consultation can prevent and cure those who have PTSD and other mental difficulties caused by death-related incidents in the combat fields. Discussions and consultations held under the leadership of the Bundeswehr chaplains and the "peer" leaders trained by the ZIF provide the soldiers — in a more informal atmosphere — with more room to explore and rediscover their consciousness of deaths as well as clarifying legal and the practicalities concerning the casualty-related formalities for their families. The training hosted by the UNTCB give realistic experiences through the life-threatening crisis awareness courses and the body-undertaking skill classes, which the participating soldiers and other civilians (in the case of the latter) can face deaths in a most direct form.

51

Second, the German experiences also demonstrate the richness of the practical family support services that can deliver direct care to bereaved families. The Psychotrauma Centre's initiative to bring the surviving families to the site of the soldier's death has proven a potent instrument for them to accept and justify the death of their loved ones. Post-mortem grief care given by the military chaplains as well as financial and other practical assistance for funeral arrangements provided by the community family support centres is vital hands-on help schemes required immediately after the death while the family members have fallen devastated in confusion.

Third, the German services offer assistant that helps cement spiritual and emotional ties amongst the fallen soldiers, their surviving colleagues and families, and the *Bundeswehr* as a whole, encouraging the public's consciousness of remembrance of the dead. The Bundeswehr Military History Museums display a number of photos and sometimes disquieting authentic post-incident objects informing and questioning the museum visitors of the meanings of human sacrifice in contribution to international peace. The role of the Forest is similar but more directly appealing to the visitors. The place is specifically dedicated to the fallen in foreign missions, and their names are inscribed. The official ceremonies taken place around the monuments provide the families and the public with the *Bundeswehr*'s vigorous gesture of remembrance of their contribution.

Fourth, the German practices also reveal the significance of institutionalised support infrastructure for any soldiers and their families who may have to face death in a variety of aspects of their life. Lobbying activities by the military union as well as the Ombudsman group to protect the soldiers' rights have been proven feasible and effective because the support structures are legally guaranteed, allowing the requests are formally filed, monitored, and evaluated. In the same token, the support activities offered by the

Community Family Support Centres are carefully programmed and organised with professionals in the fields of family and health cares in many aspects designed to better match the needs of the families.

It is not to say that all these services and activities can be simply imitated to the case in Japan, but careful examinations must be made for future implementation to best fit the unique Japanese legal, cultural, financial and other circumstances. Nevertheless, the examples from the *Bundeswehr* need to be considered as effective references for a starting point for any initial step for improving family support services for future death of JSDF soldiers in missions abroad. Should bereaved families feel treated insufficiently after their member's death, they would gradually lose trust towards the JSDF. This may well contribute to a lack of public support for any high-risk military activities home and abroad, eventually further contributing to discouraging the JSDF's recruitment policy in the long run.

In the near future, Japan will have to confront itself with an inevitable necessity to embark on family support services and programmes for these specific purposes. Failure to prepare for them may well inflict this chain of the vicious circle.

A Study on the ROK Armed Forces' Military Family Support Policy

--- From Private Domain to Public Domain

Youngju Lee

Korea Military Academy / Republic of Korea

Men who are over 20 years old in Korea and who do not have health problems should all be obligated to serve the national defense. That is why before sons are sent to the army, mothers prepare and read the following books, *Majesty's Military Life Guide* or *The Military Story*, both of which mothers and sons should know before military enlistment. Accordingly, in Korea, it is rather difficult to find a family that does not have relatives in the military. But in this presentation, we are targeting military professionals, not soldiers working in the military for only about 22 months.

The military has a different character than other organizations. Despite the opinion that it is being transformed into an occupational organization, the military still demands devotion and self-sacrifice, and soldiers acknowledge this. In short, the military can be described as a "greedy institution".[1] In particular, it is a problem that this organization demands devotion and sacrifice not only from soldiers but also from their families. To fulfil the demands of the military, the military family as well as military professionals need to adapt themselves to peculiar military circumstances. However, there are

---

[1] Lewis A. Coser: Greedy Institutions: PATTERNS OF UNDIVIDED COMMITMENT, New York: Free Press, 1974, pp.166.

exceedingly few studies on military families in Korea. The paucity of research on the military family is partly due to the unique role of the Korean military in the nation's geo-political situation and partly due to confidential security-based reasons. Certainly, many world-class forces in other national contexts already recognize military families as part of the national army. We must also, therefore, pay attention to the support of them as they form the basis for the influx of talented people and for military welfare.

I. Challenges of a Military Family

According to the Military Welfare Basic Act of 1997, the military family includes, first, the spouse; in the next category, the direct continuity of the relevant person and the spouse; and in a broad sense, the lineal descent of the person and the spouse. As we have mentioned above, the military needs more sacrifice and support from the family than other jobs. In this chapter, I try to analyze the practical difficulties experienced by military families. The characteristics of the military family are described in the following section.

1. Sharing of Responsibilities and Burden

Military Families have joint responsibilities and joint burden-sharing. Soldiers perform their duties with their lives at stake, such as participating in combat or dangerous fighting. They live with the possibility that they may face a situation in which they have to sacrifice their lives for the nation and the people, and such a burden is shared by their families. When a soldier dies or is seriously hurt, the normal life of the soldier's family very soon becomes difficult. The soldier's family has a sense of obligation to live through such anxiety and worry.

2. Frequent Movements and Isolation

Due to Korea's security situation and military unique situation, most soldiers live in remote backwoods or battlefront areas, and most serve in poor surroundings, such as operational missions and emergency stand-bys. According to the research, the average number of Change of residence in the military life of a soldier is 16.2 times. For this reason, their families also have to live an isolated life and are separated from general society for a long period. This isolation causes problems such as in the matters of childcare, education, housing, and welfare. The families also have a hard time to adjust to new environments due to frequent movements. They suffer from the shortage of cultural facilities and daily necessities. Especially, discontentment about their educational environment is high, particularly among those military families with children in middle school or higher levels. In addition, frequent moves aggravate their economic hardship and ensure that the military communities that are formed are only temporary. Moving locales usually occurs once a year, and the process costs a good deal both through direct and indirect causes.

3. Irregular Working Patterns and Working Hours

Other major stress factors are long working hours and irregular work schedules. Irregular official work and frequent recalls make a serviceman unable to regularly help in any family work that is related to household tasks and to childcare with the result that most of it has to be done by the wife. The wives regret that their husbands cannot share the experience of childbirth because of duties. Until recently, however, wives did not typically regard this circumstance as unfair because most other military families in other national contexts were living in the same situation. But, currently, roles between husbands

and wives—between men and women—are becoming unclear; this means that wives and children are demanding more and more roles and responsibilities for their husbands and fathers.

4. Transformed Family Type Focused on One Parent

This is why child-centered families with high educational aspirations are voluntarily choosing to live separately. The rigidity of the educational administration in Korea gives them no other choice. These factors hinder stable family life. This transformed family type, in which all the responsibilities and roles of one parent are transferred to the other parent, has become solidified. Because most of the soldiers are men, their wives' roles have expanded. Soldiers' wives require abilities in variety of areas when their husbands are not available due to the peculiarities of their job requirements. Regular absences of husbands demand strong emotional stability and the ability to endure loneliness. Some couples form a separate life pattern firmly when the absence is prolonged. So, when their husbands return home, they have a hard time adjusting to the reunion.

Lydia Sloan Cline's book *Today`s Military Wife*, which has already been published in the seventh edition, is recognized as a guide for wives with husbands who have such a special military career.[2] The book prescribes for soldiers' wives patience, "elbow grease (the effort used in physical work)", courage, tolerance, and a dash of adventure.[3] According to her, in order to become a good soldier's wife, a positive attitude is needed

---

[2] Vgl. Lydia Sloan Cline: Today`s Military Wife. Meeting The Challenges of Service Life, Stackpole Books 1989.: Recipe for a Military Wife -1 1/2 spoons patience, 2 tablespoon elbow grease, 1 pound courage, 1 cup tolerance, dash of adventure Marinate frequently with salty tears and pour off excess fat. Sprinkle ever so lightly with money, kneading dough well until payday. Season with international spices. Bake for twenty years or until done. Serve with pride!

to understand the job of a soldier first and then to positively discover the benefits that a soldier can receive. It is based on the belief that the "strong forces of [the] US Army start at home." In modern society, however, the family is dominated by a couple of nuclear families and the power relations of the couple are equalized. Therefore, in this type of family where one parent is absent for a long time, the role of the other, mainly the wife, becomes excessive, and that leads to serious marital problems. This can also cause problems with child development.

5. An Economic Burden

In addition, a majority of soldiers are discharged from the service at between 45 and 56 years of age, having spent the greatest part of their lives in service due to the rank-based retirement system, and they are under enormous economic pressure. Also guaranteeing stable housing conditions is extremely important for soldiers who are required to move frequently and to work in remote areas. Therefore, for families that cannot move into military residences, it is necessary to borrow money to buy a house. In this case, they have to pay the loan back over a long period of time.

Military families must cope with many difficulties: living in an isolated environment with worse living conditions; experiencing frequent moving, poor housing, lack of support for child education and care, limited medical services, and lack of leisure facilities; and having fathers serving on 24-hour stints as commanders, administrators, and instructors. The problem of the military family turns out to be more severe than civilians can imagine. It is suggested that the military administration should be more flexible in multilateral ways—considering the individual needs of the military family and specific circumstances around them.

II. The Function of Military Family

1. The Link between Military and Society

In Korea, military families have different functions compared to families of other organizations. Until now, the Korea military has been relative "unsociable" due to security reasons, and its relationship with the general public and its accessibility for civilians have been limited as well. In such circumstances, military families are the primary group that connect the military with the general public. Therefore, understanding the military family is the basic foundation for the understanding and improvement of civil-military relations.

2. Affect the Combat Readiness of the Military

In addition, the stable life of the military family is closely related to national security issues that directly affect the combat readiness of the military because intangible elements impact the combat power of soldiers, such as morale, military discipline, and solidarity, all of which can be derived from their families to a great degree; that is, the stability of the family leads to the stability of the soldiers and also to the security of the military and the nation, in turn.

3. Image Enhancement Function for the Military

The military has been transformed from a public organization based on previously held values such as patriotism or loyalty to a professional model based on economic rewards and professional stability. This will become the case even more if the current atmosphere of peace in Korea continues. As the military becomes more occupational, the military will compete with civilian organizations for a good workforce. Among the incentives that the military can or should present, the compensation system for the soldier himself and his

family will work as a prime factor.

In this sense, understanding and closely analyzing the unique characteristics of military families and their difficulties and needs are necessary. The military and the military family are one and the same community. The family also serves. They, as a military partner, help soldiers keep to their duty and accomplish the original mission. Military servicemen and their family members experience not only normal life stress but also specific job-related stress. Support and social services for military family are necessary, not optional.

III. Development Process of Korean Military Welfare

1. Changes in the Korean Welfare System

The spouses and children of soldiers live with heavy burdens. But a while ago, Korean society did not consider the actual difficulties experienced by military families, such as moving homes and child education, to be the families' problems. However, more people have sympathy for the distinctiveness of military families, and the Korean military is pushing ahead with an action plan, the [Second Basic Plan for Soldier Welfare] that was established in 2013, so as to expand its support for military families. We can see the changes in the Korean Welfare System, historically, from the establishment of the ROK to the current development of National Defence Position.

period	welfare policy
the 50s	○ A level of urgency to keep a living (payment-in-kind)
the 60s	○ The beginning of the welfare system
the 70s	○ The expansion of welfare benefits - School fees exemption for children; applications available for family medical insurance; a duty-free goods system; recreation-area constructions
the 80s	○ The establishment of partial mid-term plan - 5-year planning for construction of official residences ○ The establishment of the Military Mutual Aid Association (1984)
the 90s	○ Military Welfare Fund Act (1995) ○ The National Pensions Act (2000) ○ The expansion and maintenance of official residences
~ 2016	○ The implementation of a customized welfare system ○ Care for soldiers' couples

In order to solve the housing problem of soldiers, the ministry of national defense (MND) recently sold private apartments to soldiers in collaboration with the Housing Corporation. In addition, the customized welfare system has made it possible for both soldiers as well as their families to buy insurance at low prices. In terms of child education, the MND has also established a system to provide incentives to the children of soldiers for entering the university. Welfare for military couples is also being considered.

2. Current Military Family Support Policy

It is necessary to develop comprehensive, continuous, further expanded, careful family

support services based on an objective evaluation of existing support measures. To improve this, the MND has proposed a large framework for military family support in the Defence White Paper in 2016.

2.1. Implementing an Effective Military Residence Support Program

In 2016, the MND established the "comprehensive plan for the development of military housing policies" so as to ensure stable housing conditions for service members, while reducing its financial burden at the same time. The MND plans to utilize private housing to a greater extent, thus moving away from the traditional system of the military having to build its own residences; the MND thus intends to manage military residential accommodations more efficiently by managing them by region in an integrated manner rather than by units. This can also stimulate the link between the military and civil society.

2.2. Vitalizing the Maternity Protection System

The MND has implemented policies related to pregnancy, childbirth, and childcare policies to help career service members attain a good work-family life balance. Starting in 2015, leave of absence due to infertility and subfertility has been guaranteed, and both male and female service members can take leave. The duration of the leave has also been extended to up to two years, and the portion of salary paid during leave has been raised. In 2016, the MND expanded the eligible members for exemption from night duty due to pregnancy and childbirth to include female military civilians, while it raised the allowance paid during maternity leave to 200,000 won. The military will maintain its efforts to foster a family-friendly military culture by continuously improving the relevant systems together with the related publicity activities and education.

2.3. Expanding Military Childcare Facilities

The MND has secured childcare facilities phase by phase in conjunction with the military residence construction plan in order to improve the military's challenging childcare environment. The military now operates 105 military day-care centers (as of October 2016), and it plans to build an additional 172 by 2021. The military is striving to reduce childcare blind spots in forward areas by adjusting the requirements for the installation of a day-care center. Day-care centers were previously available to units with 100 or more military households but are now available to units with 15 or more children who require day-care. In areas where childcare centers cannot be installed, the MND has established the "cooperative childcare space" concept in coordination with the Ministry of Gender Equality as well as family and private-sector firms.

2.4. Enhancing the Educational Environment for Military Children

Career service members have long faced the challenge of providing good quality education for their children as they frequently relocate and often work in remote areas. In order to assist the education of children who face challenges stemming from the frequent relocations of their parents, the military is providing support. The military offers these children scholarships and interest-free loans for university tuition fees. The MND has established the Hanmin High School, a boarding school which provides a stable study environment for military children. The foundation of a boarding school has boosted the morale of career service members and has helped the military to secure talents since children who are admitted to the Hanmin High School can focus on their studies without having to transfer to another school because of their parent's relocations, while their parents can focus on their military career thanks to the alleviated educational burden.

However, there is the drawback that only a small number of children can use these schemes.

IV. Suggestions for Development

It is true that welfare policies targeting today's military families have become diverse and delicate. However, it is also true that it is difficult to pursue an integrated and continuous welfare policy because the welfare policy establishment and enforcement system is still scattered among various institutions. Also, these measures are focused more on the hardware part that is centered on food, clothing, and shelter; an in-depth welfare system has not yet been established yet. In terms of welfare environment, the welfare facilities operated by the military itself should be opened, and the facilities of civil society should be shared with each other and closely interacted with each other. This extended welfare project should create a mutually friendly relationship between ordinary citizens and military families. The military should focus on building a healthy family and its community to raise the morale and to improve the combat power of the armed forces. The major direction can be described as follows.

1. An Integrated Support System

First, an integrated support system should be established to promote welfare policies with a specialization in relation to soldiers and their families. There are no dedicated departments or agencies in Korea to support military families. The welfare policies which was until now conducted are mainly carried out under the Ministry of National Defense's personnel welfare office with other policies. Therefore, it is difficult compared to other policies to be prioritized and to provide systematic support. Specialist groups, dedicated

support organizations, and support systems should be established so that material, emotional, and psycho-social support can be provided through accurate nvestigation, analysis, and evaluation of military families.

2. The Housing problem

Second, from the residential perspective, we must escape a residential operation that is dependent on the military official residence. Instead, large-scale integrated residential complexes and cooperation with communities and exchanges should be formed. In addition, a more efficient system should be provided to help military families prepare for their homes so that they can live a stable life after retirement.

3. The Education Problem

Third, educational issues should not be regarded as private concerns. It must also be transformed into a form of coexistence with society away from finding solutions solely within the military. Furthermore, a system should be established to encourage and support the education of children as well as other families, typically wives. This can alleviate the isolation of military families and inspire pride as a "family of soldiers." Through this, the independence of the military family can be solved, and self-reliance and economic power can be acquired. If you are interested in going back to school, the Education Center can help. Here you can get applications for graduate exams and information on programs, curricula, and degrees. Out-of-state colleges are contracting with the armed forces to set up at military installations. You can attend their classes and receive a diploma without ever having set foot on the main campus.

4. Family Service Center

Fourth, military family welfare should be extended to health and medical care as well as psychological and social support. It is necessary to have a management center, for example, a family service center, that can solve and control the problems such as transfers, housing, family problems, and so forth. The mission of the Family Service Center can give help in both everyday living and in crisis situations so as to make your life less stressful. Family Service Center provide also role as Legal Aid. Most installations have a legal office. Here one can get free legal advice and assistance. Services offered include the drawing up of wills, powers of attorney and bills of sale, tenant problems, and the interpretation of leases, domestic relations, civil rights, and so on.

5. Flexible Working Place and Time

Fifth, the autonomy of working hours and working places will be of great help in securing the stability of military and military families while aiming to achieve more flexible and efficient performance. For example, teleworking provides flexibility for military personnel through greater sovereignty in the choice of place of work and working time. In the case of teleworking, the work is partly carried out at the home workplace at agreed-upon attendance times and within the framework of self-determined working hours. Applications from family and disability workers should, however, be given priority in this respect. "Location-independent work" aims to improve the compatibility of family emergencies and business needs for all of Korea's military personnel. For example, in situations where family members of military personnel are unable or insufficiently cared for or where the temporary presence of commuters is mandatory at home, the specific family interest may, under certain conditions, be linked to the needs of the service.

However, provision should be made without bureaucratic hurdles for the short-term application of these needs.

V. Conclusion

The military is an organization that was created for the purpose of maintaining the state. The characteristics of the organization, such as the absoluteness of purpose, class authority, and group cohesion, are not only difficult for soldiers but also for military families. Since the stability and happiness of the military family is directly connected with the stability of the military, the nation, and the people, customized welfare benefits should be provided for the military families that meet the changes of society. Through this, soldiers and military families can live with pride without being tired of their military occupation. Currently, the ROK Armed Forces should carry out a detailed military family welfare policy under the slogan "state and social stability comes from the health and happiness of soldiers and their families."

The Intention-Realization Discrepancy:

An Anthropological Study of Marriage Hunting with the JSDF Officials

Atsuko Fukuura

Shiga University/ Japan

1 Introduction

This study principally aims to discover the relationship between marriage and military institutions. For this purpose, based on an anthropological investigation, I focus on marriage hunting with the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) personnel, especially combination on a male member of the JSDF and a female civilian applicant. If marriage is a new life of two independent persons, it would be an intimate sphere; however, if a JSDF official is married, it will be affected the institutional logic of a government agency, in the public sphere.

In Japan, the arranged marriage ratio continues to decline. In around 1950 it was 54%, and in 2015 it was 5.5% [IPSS 2017: 38]. However, in this survey, we cannot know their chance of coupling, how to know each other. Marriage hunting parties are people searching for a marriage partner. It's popular in Japan, however marriage hunting party on the JSDF personnel is a kind of targeted marriage measures. The Staff Office of the JSDF has not concerned about it officially, however the NCO association in each base has cooperated with it.

The JSDF as military institutions shows concern for the marriage, I'll focus to the significance to get marry for the military institutions. According to the Ground SDF, 57% of members are married. The ratio of female members in the JSDF is 6.5% (JSDF 2018). Over 90% of these female members are married. This shows the JSDF is the central focus on married man, however they try to turn a single man centered or rejuvenated on NCO. From 2014, the number of new enlist in the JSDF is decrease and falls below planned fixed total number. After October 2018, they have expanded to those enlisted from 26 years of age to 32 years of age. One of the reasons is the declining birth rate, besides that there are salary cuts of civil service, civilian companies extend their hiring of new graduates, and 2015 Japanese military legislation.

In the other research I investigated about marriage hunting in other metropolitan area, there were many major industries, local people were able to choose many stable occupations other than JSDF. Mostly female applicants also came from same area. According to the private marriage hunting agency, after enactment of the 2015 Japanese military legislation civilian female applicants have decreased on this agency (Fukuura in print). In the 5-metropolitan area, depending on the economic situation and historical background, in some areas the JSDF is still important industry and employer. This time I focus on such areas.

I present two questions, (1) what were their motives to attend or hold a party? (2) What does the organizer expect from JSDF officials and civilian women applicants?

2 Previous studies about civil-military relationships in anthropological and sociological studies

Research on the relationship between family and military careers characterized the military institution as greedy: "…two societal institutions—the military and the family—intersect. Both make great demands of individuals in terms of commitments, loyalty, time, and energy; they, therefore, have some of the characteristics of what Coser calls "greedy" institutions" (Segal, 1986).

After the twenty-first century, research on family functions in the military has increased, for example, Melvin et al.'s (2015) research on high-functioning army couples: "The military lifestyle and planned deployment separations create both challenges and opportunities for preventive interventions pre- and post-deployment. …The couples' strategies of 'go with the flow' and 'open your heart,' when combined with the family strategy of 'normalizing schedules,' describe the construction of a flexible framework for building family relationships (Melvin et al. 2015:15)."

Spouses support military member's domestic lives and the formation of their careers in military institutions. Recently, many scholars reported that trauma in the military family heavily influences service member's deployments, and spouses still have multiple roles (cf. Spera 2009; Warner 2009; Brockman et al. 2016).

Many scholars have investigated the relationship between families and the frequency of deployment, considering military family stress and the number and length of deployments, parenting, child adjustment, and family readiness (Gewirtz et al. 2017; Meadows et al. 2017; Pexton & Yule2018).

Lundquist and Xu studied marriage and military institutions, stating that "the military plays an explicit role in this linking process because it depends upon spousal support roles to operate. … The military is innately structured to encourage early marriage among its recruits so that it can function efficiently. This is seen most clearly in its provision of a vast safety net and springboard for its members and its formulation of policies specifically intended to make it more convenient to marry than remain single" (2014: 1066, 1076-1077). Consequently, military institutions expect and compel member families to adjust to the institutional context; in the other words reinstitutionalize family. As seen, the military was populated by single males historically; however, recently the military has expected some family involvement in their make-up.

In anthropological research on the JSDF, it has been shown that one of the characteristics of this institution is using equivocal expressions to obscure a state of violence which military institutions have. Following WWII, the military tried to avoid unfavorable comments from Japanese society.

Ben-Ari and Frühstück mentioned these concrete expressions and methods (Ben-Ari 2011; Frühstück 2008). Furthermore, I researched marriage hunting parties and their connection with the local area and JSDF male personnel and female spouses (Fukuura 2019 inprint). In previously mentioned research, I have not yet investigated the significance of a marriage hunting for each actor as an organizer and participant. This paper discusses each actor's expectation for marriage hunting activities, seen from the perspective of military members and families.

Consequently, in this paper, I discuss the relationship between the military institution and marriage, whereby I explore interactions through organizational principles as a national public service in which civilians participate.

3 Method

I conducted a semi-structured interview from 2017–2018 for this paper. The subjects were two female civilian applicants, one male personnel applicant, and four NCO organizers. One of the female civilian applicants was married to an NCO in a marriage hunting party, and I interviewed her after she married. Both female civilian applicants were in their 30s and lived in the metropolitan area. The male personnel applicant was also in his 30s, lived in a provincial town, and was affiliated with the same institution. Of the four NCO organizers, one lived in the metropolitan area, and three lived in a provincial town; they were in their 40s–50s.

4 Case study about marriage hunting parties

4-(1) Organizers

There are three types of organizers of marriage hunting parties, one is an NCO, the second is a joint host organizer, and the third is an individual organizer. Joint host organizers include three types: civilian and NCO associations, civilian and OB associations, and quasi-JSDF organizations assisting the JSDF activities hosting with NCOs. Parties are generally held in the welfare facility on their institution's site. Civilian organizers have held parties in restaurants or outside hotels.

Central staff officers do not order the local division to hold parties, but most of the base host parties. Superior officers order personnel to attend marriage hunting parties. In the metropolitan area, fewer civilians gathered. After a new mid-term plan for the JSDF, dynamic internal transfer began in the Ground JSDF; many NCOs also transferred beyond the jurisdiction control area for four or six years. These mostly single officials willingly attend marriage hunting parties when they move to a provincial area.

4-(2) Feature of parties

Parties in a metropolitan area…case1

Case one: a party was held in one of the five metropolitan areas, and this city's population was about 3 million[1]. The population is increasing despite the declining birthrate and age growth, the employment rate of couples is lower than the national average, the marriage rate is higher, the civil income is lower, the service industry holds over 30% within industrial structure, and the gross prefectural product is sluggish (Cabinet Office 2017; NIPSSR 2017). The JSDF has become one of the main businesses in this area.

NCO-A was in his 40s, and he organized marriage hunting parties several times in the restaurant outside the base. The participants of these events included 30–80 people. According to NCO-A, the local people understood the JSDF well, and the relationship between local people and the JSDF was moving in a good direction.

---

[1] For example, the Tokyo metropolitan area's population is about 37 million.

He said, "I want to let the young members join a marriage hunting party, my main target is young NCOs. I hope as many young members as possible will participate with this . . . [the] General District Commander submitted an order. Fewer and fewer member[s] come to join the NCO association's activities, that's institutional intention, I think. This association also supports special school students to get around town in wheelchairs".

This NCO's association carried out many activities: fruit picking, riding on a houseboat, watching fireworks, and kimono-wearing classes for the WAC. He said, "the commander wants to promote our members to volunteer work on their day off. That is the Commander's wish." The NCO's explained his philosophy behind these activities: "Marriage makes us able to concentrate on working. For this purpose, I try to create a workplace environment, to increase their willingness to work. I think a stable home environment lets them concentrate on working."

Every time he gives notices about parties on the website of his base, he provides applicants with his phone number. Generally, reservations from female civilians are fully booked before the deadline, and some are in a waiting list. NCO-A explained that, a few years ago, there were very few civilian female applicants, the program at that time was not popular because of a curling game (played on ice).

When the attendees come to the parties, they filled out profile cards for exchange. Commonly listed items were name, age, address, academic background, family members, and hobbies, etc. Female attendee filled in items related to their cooking specialties and regular days off; while male attendees filled in their annual income,

whether they had a car, rank in the JSDF, and their birthplace. Gender gaps appeared in the items which applicants and organizers expected.

Parties in a provincial city…case2

The next case is in the provincial city, where the population is about 40,000, but an NCO as organizer said one quarter was the person concerned. The population here is decreasing like in other provincial towns in Japan. In addition to the NCO organizing marriage hunting parties, there is also an OB association which organizes parties.

Marriage hunting parties with the help of civilian agencies in this base began in 2013 and are held twice a year. Assistance from the OB association began in 2015 and are held once a year. The civilian agency invites female civilian participants on their web site, NCOs ask First Sergeants to call out male participants. According to the NCO in his 50s, in the beginning, the civilian agency asked to assist in holding marriage hunting parties, because civilian women tend to believe that JSDF personnel have steady, official positions, it would be more likely to this tendency in such a suburban city.

In 2017, the base twice held parties with a civilian agency. At the first party, there was no limit of the number of male applicants (61 people attended), then they divided into two sessions per day. Fifty-three women attended, and their age was between 20 and late 40s. The first session included people under the age of 30, and the second session was for those 30. Some men attended both sessions. At each table seven men and seven women alternately introduced themselves for one minute, then the men moved one person along. After this, they played games, chatted freely, then the number

corresponding to their favorite person on paper. The NCOs collected the papers and combined matched numbers.

The NCO in his 50s listed three significance of these parties: (1) to prevent the decline in birthrate; (2) to revitalize their workplace; and (3) to assist soldiers to devote themselves to their duties by meeting a reliable partner. The NCO in his 40s said, "some personnel think about their job as a means for the next step in their career. I don't intend to keep them back, but I expect if these personnel meet a partner in this city, they will try their best to do their job as JSDF personnel." These two NCO came from other prefectures, their wives were locals, and they bought their own houses where they lived. They contributed to the local growth in population.

The OB association believe that marriage with local women is positive. However, this association worked hard to secure female civilian applicants in 2016 and 2017. In 2017, there were 35 male applicants, though the number of females was below the required figure. The NCO in his 40s explained that the advertisement method was inappropriate as the OB made announcements on their lesser-known website.

In any case, the NCO intended for marriage hunting parties was to allow personnel to devote themselves to their jobs after marriage and improve their sense of belonging to the institution.

At this base in case 2, I also interviewed one NCO in his 30s, who attended a marriage hunting party where he met a partner in 2014 whom he married in 2016. Before this party he was invited to attend by the first sergeant, the entrance fee for men was 5,000-yen and 4,500-yen for women. This included a buffet party; 20 men and 20 women were attended. Afterward, he kept company with his prospective partner for 18

months. Their first date was the base as his workplace. His girlfriend did not have any information about the JSDF, he thought he should introduce her his work. Before their date, she also tried to understand his job by reading PR magazines, after they got married, he knew about it.

When their parents and relatives met for the first time, he wore his uniform to represent his character and help others understand his job. After they married, he told his wife that, if anything happened in future, he could be dispatched on duty. She said, "I'm ok as long as you don't leave me alone." He meant that he could be killed or injured on war or dispatch, actually his work would not involve such a fatal job, however in case natural disaster he should dispatch. He expected to obtain wife's understanding on this matter, he was not sure she realized this meaning.

Female civilian applicants from the metropolitan are…-case3

Ms. D is in her 30s. When she applied to join a marriage hunting party she lived in a metropolitan area, where 12 million people lived. In 2017, she attended a party held by civilian agents and an NCO association outside the base. There were more than 120 participants, and her future husband was present. She has no relatives who are JSDF personnel. She graduated from university, worked in a private company, then went to study abroad. After returning to Japan, she re-visited this foreign country with her mother as tourists. At that time, they came across a kind of revolution in this foreign country, unfamiliar foreign countries soldiers protected them under an unstable political situation. Since coming back to Japan, Ms. D attended a marriage hunting with JSDF

personnel. Afterward, her opinion about soldiers changed, and she elected to join a marriage hunting party for the JSDF.

Ms. D attended several marriage hunting parties with the JSDF. In the spring of 2016, she met her future husband, and they went out for six months before marrying. Before marriage, she lived in another metropolitan area, then moved his house, which he had bought when he was single. After they lived together, he took some insurance, and said, "if something happened, you will be alone but able to make a steady living with my insurance." She told me, "at first I thought he was a careful person, however, I heard it repeatedly, I began to worry about the possibility."

Ms. D felt a need for protection by big things from when she was small. Before attending marriage hunting, she often got on the train and went to see big naval vessels on her holiday. She explained that maybe her unconscious thoughts led to a hope to marry military personnel.

One more case is Ms. E in her 30s, who was born and raised in a metropolitan area, as was Ms. D. She also has no relatives in the JSDF. She began marriage hunting with JSDF personnel because her favorite actor played the lead in the Airforce SDF story, "Flying Public Relations" on the TV drama. This programme followed a young JSDF man who built his career under the advice from his senior in the PR division. The leading character got to know an ordinary woman on the story, at first this woman held an unfavorable opinion of the JSDF, then they came closer gradually. After the TV drama series finished, she was very interested in the JSDF and attended the base festival. Consequently she tried to seek of collecting information and visited several bases. She then attended marriage hunting parties.

5 Conclusion

The male applicants were invited to attend marriage hunting by their superiors in each affiliated post. Their base commander guided the representative NCOs. They sponsored marriage hunting parties so personnel could meet female partners for marriage, to dedicate themselves more fully to their duties, and to reinforce their sense of belonging to the JSDF.

From the perspective of NCOs, they expected prospective spouses would understand the collective values of the JSDF as a military institution, would support domestic work, and be prepared for the worst.

For personnel, marriage hunting parties are an opportunity to meet ordinary civilian women. They are also an opportunity to experience tender attention from these women. In other words, marriage hunting parties are a chance to build a sense of belonging to military institutions, and to ensure the JSDF has a fair and positive view from society. This process is similar to the male body construct to the military power, and it embedded is in masculinity, as Ben-Ari has discussed (cf: Ben-Ari 2017).

One female civilian applicant yearned for military men, and another was affected by trends in a consumer society, influenced by a TV drama to attend a JSDF marriage hunting party. Marriage as a local activity influenced global processes.

Conversely, an OB association in a provincial city studied in this paper on the case 2 that organized a marriage party over two years did not attract female civilian applicants. The JSDF personnel are not always well known in their area. Thus, I should investigate in greater detail about the economic situation, historical background, and specific conditions in each area.

Each actor's intention for marriage hunting differed. Military institutions are total institutions; however, they need to incorporate spouses from outside their structure. In this sense, marriage is a kind of frontline.

References

Ben-Ari, Eyal. (2011). Public Events and the Japan Self-Defense Forces: Aesthetics, Ritual Density and the Normalization of Military Violence. Six-Hohenbalken, Maria & N. Weiss eds., *Violence Expressed: An Anthropological Approach*. Surrey & Burlington: Ashgate, pp.55-69.

Ben-Ari, Eyal. (2017). Weapons as (Lethal) Things: The Body, Emotion and Personal Firearms in the Military. *Japanese Review of Cultural Anthropology*. 18(1): 115-127.

Brockman, Callie, James Snyder, Abigail Gewirtz, et al. (2016). Relationship of Service Members' Deployment Trauma, PTSD Symptoms and Experiential Avoidance to Postdeployment Family Reengagement. *Journal of Family Psychology*. 30 (1): 52-62.

Frühstück, Sabine. (2008). *Uneasy Warriors: Gender, Memory and Popular Culture in the Japanese Army*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Fukuura, Atsuko. (In print). Marriage Hunting and Civil-Military Relations in Japan. Sørensen, R. Birgitte & Eyal Ben-Ari. Eds. *Civil-Military Entanglements: Anthropological Perspectives*. New York: Berghahn.

Gewirtz, H. Abigail, D. Degarmo, O. Zamir. (2017). Testing a Military Family Stress Model. *Family Process*, 10: 1-17.

JSDF. (2018). *Defense of Japan 2018*. Tokyo: Urban Connections.

Lundquist, Jennife Xu. (2014). Reinstitutionalizing Families: Life Course Policy and Marriage in the r and Zhun Military. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 76: 1063-1081.

Meadows, O. Sara, T. Tanielian, B. Karney, T. Schell, et al. (2017). The Deployment Life Study: Longitudinal Analysis of Military Families across the Deployment Cycle. *Rand Health Quarterly*, 6(2): 7.

Melvin, C. Kristal, J. Wenzel and Bonnie M. Jennings. (2015). Strong Army Couples: A Case Study of Rekindling Marriage after Combat Deployment. *Research in Nursing & Health*. 38: 7-18.

Pexton, S. Farrants & W. Yule. (2018). The impact of fathers' military deployment on child adjustment. The support needs of primary school children and their families separated during active military service: A pilot study. *Clinical Child Psychology & Psychiatry*, 23(1): 110-124.

Segal, Mady. (1986). The Military and the Family as a Greedy Institutions. *Armed Forces & Society*. 13(1): 9-38.

Spera, Christopher. (2009). Spouses' Ability to Cope with Deployment and Adjust to Air Force Family Demands: Identification of Risk and Protective Factors. *Armed Forces & Society*. 35 (2): 286-306.

Warner, H. Christopher, George N. Appenzeller, et al. (2009). Psychological Effects of Deployments on Military Families. *Psychiatric Annals*. 39 (2): 56-63.

government statistics

Cabinet Office 2017.

https://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/data/kakuhou/files/2017/2017annual_report_e.html

(Accessed 14 November 2018)

e-Stat Statistics of Japan. https://www.e-stat.go.jp/dbview?sid=0003149249   (Accessed

14 November 2018)

NIPSSR National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. *Population*

Statistics of Japan 2017. http://www.ipss.go.jp/p-info/e/psj2017/PSJ2017.asp

(Accessed 14 November 2018)

IPSS (The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research). 2017. *Annual*

Population and Social Security Surveys. www.ipss.go.jp/ps-

doukou/e/doukou15/Nfs15R_points_eng.pdf   (Accessed 14 November 2018)

Love and the Greedy Institution

René Moelker and Manon Andres

Netherlands Defense Academy/ Netherlands

For those who are at times far away and yet so close

Introduction: love under stress of deployment induced separation

In this study we explored the politics of relations that are under stress, negotiating military and family life. When love is under stress, tensions can be resolved by trying to keep the relationship as good as it can be. A practical resolve at the micro individual level comes from 'dating from a distance', meaning that couples can balance the power relations between them by relatively simple techniques of communication. Although simple, they are grounded in complex insight into the changes that define modern love.

International research has shown that relations do deteriorate whence they shift into being long distance relationships, caused by deployment-induced separation. The statistics indicate that 40 per cent of all long distance relationships break up; four and a half months is the average time a long distance relationship breaks up if it is not going

to work.[1] From this data we may tentatively extrapolate that the time halfway to three quarters of a military deployment is the most difficult. Later on in the deployment, there might be 'channel fever', the anticipatory stress one experiences in the anticipation of homecoming. In the British and Dutch navies, passing the channel meant that one is almost home, hence the name 'channel fever'. At this stage, people (including spouses back home) are nervous, but they are not breaking up. On the contrary, they will soon enter the phase of marital reconciliation. Sometimes, a deployment makes a relationship stronger, but more often relationships deteriorate. Longitudinal research among deployed military personnel and their spouses shows that relationship satisfaction after the deployment is significantly lower than before the deployment; 18 per cent of the relationships deteriorate considerably, whereas 11 per cent improved significantly (Andres, 2010). In all stages, couples negotiate and renegotiate their relationship because it is always in flux, ever changing and not always for the best. So how to make the best of it? How to make each other's lives a little bit happier?

The answer also depends on negotiations at the level of the state and the organization for it is a political process at three intertwined levels with always three or more actors involved (see framework presented in chapter 1). The bargain is sometimes formal or informal, explicit or implicit, and more or less trades of care provisions and remuneration against loyalty, support and labor. At the state level, modernizing processes result in a shift from institutional to occupational types of covenant. At the organizational level, one can observe a variety of arrangements that sometimes strongly

---

[1] https://deesdatingdiary.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/making-a-long-distance-relationship-work-infographic.jpg (Accessed 28 November 2018).

rely on self-help on the one hand, whilst they may depend on traditional family support systems on the other. At the individual level, we observe a development from command households to negotiation households (Swaan, 1982).

First we will discuss what modern love looks like and especially how long distance relationships can be managed within the framework of the negotiation household. Secondly we will discuss the implications of changes in political negotiation regarding the state and organization level in an effort to get beyond the concept of the greedy institution.

Keeping up the romance during deployment in a networked society

Love

Falling in love is the easiest thing. For example, the New York Times published a 36-questions interview schedule that future partners can use during dating. The questions rise in difficulty level. Examples are

> What would constitute a 'perfect' day for you?... What do you value most in a friendship?… What is your most treasured memory?… Share with your partner an embarrassing moment in your life… Tell your partner something that you like about him/her.

After 36 questions either it works or it is perfectly clear it is never going to work! The session ends with staring at each other's eyes for four full minutes. Extremely difficult to do, but it enhances the empathic moment. Falling in love is thus only a

projection of empathy onto the other and basically these are our own desires and emotions that we project. Falling in love is only a narcistic projection of one's own desires onto the other, onto the wished for relationship in hope for reciprocity and empathic mutual identification. But the narcistic projection is a precondition for many things, amongst others for direct gratification, for getting to know each other, and for developing enduring relationships. Without self-love, love is impossible. Thus love follows its own cycle (Hofstede, 1991) which can also be applied to the love affair between two countries having to work together in a military headquarters (Moelker et al, 2007) because it is all about two parties negotiating about a working relationship. The cycle describes the politics of collaboration between two partners and that is not much different from a love affair. During the first stage high expectations result in feelings of mutual sympathy, butterflies and even some kind of excitement and euphoria. In the next stage, however, mutual sympathy will decrease, because both parties increasingly see each other's weaknesses and problems. This may even result in what is commonly known as a 'culture shock' or 'reality check' realizing the other is different. During the following acculturation phase, routinization and normalization will occur. Partners negotiate positive and negative experiences, they are being balanced and finally (in phase four) they come to a new equilibrium. This new equilibrium, however, is seldom higher than during the first phase of euphoria but this is what we normally describe as the stage where there is 'love' between the two parties. There are many definitions of love, popular and scientific, but one that is both classic and still valid is given by Erich Fromm (1956):

Love means to commit oneself without guarantee, to give oneself completely in the hope that our love will produce love in the loved person. Love is an act of faith, and whoever is of little faith is also of little love.

For being in love Fromm deems care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge to be required essentials.   Without care a relationship dwindles. Partners take responsibility for each other. Partners have to know and respect one other boundaries. Respect is not the same as adoration. Adoration often is temporal, whilst respect can persist in the long run.

Modern love in a networked society

Most servicemen during separation fear that their partner will find another lover. We cannot count on relationships being cast in concrete tied together with golden bands for "Your partner never belongs to you. At best he/she is on loan with an option to renew" (Perel, 2017). Thus soldiers and partners fear infidelity and soldiers sometimes erect a 'Wall of Shame' on which the pictures of the infidel partner are posted. They dread the day they receive a 'dear John' or 'dear Mary' e-mail. Most people in a long distance relationship discover that they are always worried they are being cheated on but it also happens that soldiers start affairs amongst themselves, with translators or with someone from the indigenous population. They sometimes cheat on their relation back home. Since you don't want to lose that person because you feel comfortable, you will start to lose touch with reality and the people who are right there for you.

The greedy family concept is still valid (DeAngelis and Segal, 2015) but it is in need of elaboration or else we need to go beyond it. From the side of the family, three

revolutions about reproduction (Perel, 2017) have impacted the politics regarding relationships. In the first revolution, sex is separated from production. The 19th century division of labor caused a separation from homework and factory work and also caused children to be recognized as children instead of miniature adults who could also be productive workers. This reduced the importance of the patriarchate as a system, because the family no longer was the primary production unit. The second revolution in the sixties and seventies separated sex from reproduction. Contraceptives (the pill) gave back to women the control over their bodies. They could have children if and when they wanted. The third revolution in the 21st century relates to gender being dissociated from biology. Gender now becomes a matter of choice. This revolution coincides with the advent of the network society.

Women have gained power because of all these revolutions. The power is multiplied because in a network society all someone has to do to coerce power in a relationship is to block the other from communication. Power balances are shifting tremendously. Boyd and Ellison (2008: 211), define social networks as:

web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and 3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system.

In all countries, social networks play a central role in communication. Whereas in former times, telephone communication and traditional mail contact were the only or most frequently used communication media during deployments (though not used on a daily basis; e.g., Ender, 1995; Schumm, Bell, Ender, and Rice, 2004), in more recent

deployments, e-mail and text messaging have become popular means of staying in touch, in addition to phone calls (e.g., Andres and Moelker, 2010; Carter et al., 2011; see also chapter 18 in this book). Facebook is also frequently used.

Networked relationships promote and enable communication and make dating during separation feasible. But there are risks to dating from a distance. One can too easily defriend a disappointing or deceitful partner from Facebook, Instagram, or other social media. Internet communication empowers both partners in the relationship, but power must be utilized with velvet gloves or preferably not at all because there are more effective ways of dialogue. The Internet equalizes power in the relationship, but although the spouses have much power one should be careful in using it. Blocking the other out from communication is the last resort, for it is the lifeline of the relationship. Use communication not to punish your loved one but to discuss matters and to further understanding in case of unclarity.

Staying in love: politics of communication

Modern demands set high standards on our partners. The ideal partner, also during deployment induced separation, is empathic, caring, sexy, attentive, a good dad and/or mum and a good conversationalist… most important, not possessive. But how to achieve all those objectives if one only has long distance communication tools available? For example: what should one tell and what should one not tell?

Coyne and Smith (1991) introduced the constructs of active engagement (supportive communication) and protective buffering as forms of relationship management.

Whereas "active engagement is a matter of involving the partner in discussions, inquiring how the partner feels, and other constructive problem solving", they conceptualized protective buffering as "a matter of hiding concerns, denying worries, and yielding to the partner to avoid disagreements" (Coyne and Smith, 1991: 405). Protective buffering is applied if the other is perceived to be under stress and in need of protection because it is feared that the information might do more damage than good.

However, findings from our Dutch Navy study (chapter 18) reveal that supportive communication is a healthy strategy, in particular for non-deployed partners, as it is positively associated with well-being and relationship quality, whereas protective reticence was not, which confirms earlier research findings in different contexts (e.g., Coyne & Smith, 1991; Joseph and Afifi, 2010; Suls et al., 1997). Researchers agree on the importance and benefits of supportive communications among romantic partners in maintaining well-being and relationship quality, especially in times of stress and separation. The findings of our study suggest that supportive communication is particularly beneficial for the perceived well being and relationship quality of partners at the home front, whereas protective reticence seems to have more disastrous implications for deployed service members.

Tips and tools for dating from a distance

Nowhere in academic literature of in scholarly teaching we discuss how to improve communication and keep up the romance. Strangely, in pre-deployment courses neither relationship skills nor sex is discussed. However, providing tips and tools could very

much contribute to relationship quality and one only has to use one's imagination. Here we provide some examples that serve as illustration only, but the list should be tailor made and fitted to the relationship.

- Compile a 'Missing You Emergency Box'. When you are really missing him/her, you can choose something from the box.
- Record and send him/her a tape of songs that remind you of him.
- Make a screensaver with pictures of the two of you and send a copy to him/her.
- Learn to say I Love You in several foreign languages, and write those to each other.
- Pretend you are stranded on a desert island and write him a love letter. Place the message in a bottle and send it to him.
- Write a book or a chapter in a book together.
- Make a batch of his favorite cookies and send them to him/her.
- Share some of your goals for the next five years.
- Do not cut yourself off from others: go to social meetings and have fun.
- Do not avoid problems: discuss with others and your loved one.
- Keep sexual intimacy alive: have flirty video chats.
- Prepare the homecoming together.
- Plan a holiday / time together.

Getting beyond the 'Greedy Institution'

The concept of the greedy institution is still valid (DeAngelis and Segal, 2015), but regarding the politics of military families the concept does need elaboration. Basically,

the greedy institution concept is a double dyadic concept. There are tensions between the armed forces organization and the soldier and there are tensions between the soldier and the family. The soldier is caught between these institutions and has to find ways to resolve the tensions. It is a functionalist construct since the tensions need to be resolved in order to further the well-functioning of the armed forces, the soldier, and the family but the construct does not well enough explain change in the system since it is focused on regaining equilibrium. The double dyadic concept is too much dichotomous to catch the complexities of present day military families. The construct wants to better the system, but it does not challenge the system and that is why we need to go beyond dyadic concept and move on to triadic modeling of military families.

In the book Politics of Military Families we discussed triads at societal, organization, and family level. At societal level, state, the armed forces, and the home front are bounded together by tensions that make one big balancing act. At the organization level, the stakeholders are the soldier, the work organization, and the military family. At the family level, the military parent, the parent, and the child are the rivaling (or collaborating) parties. Politics and agency (who gets what, when and how) lend the triads their dynamic potential for change.

Three different axes of tensions

Moreover the levels are interconnected and the interconnectedness is revealed by comparative analyses of military families worldwide, an analysis that is provided for in

the chapters of this volume. Three axes connect and/or intersect the levels of analysis.

These are:

- Institutional versus occupation

- Self-help versus familiar arrangements

- Command versus negotiation households

The actors negotiate formal and informal contracts with each other that are pictures of temporary equilibrium. The formal contract regulates mutual obligations, work for remuneration, formal rights and duties, fringe benefits and so on. The informal contract is not spelled out, and contains amongst others moral obligations, allegiance and loyalty, informal care arrangements, social support. In the United Kingdom, the semi-informal macro contract is archaically denoted 'the covenant'. At the family level and the organizational level, we often refer to the informal unwritten contract as the 'psychological contract'. When the contract is broken, or feels broken, the fault lines are revealed to the public eye. Strife and political agency will then give a certain dynamic to the systems until the actors have obtained their objectives (some will be ascending, winning, others will lose) and again a kind of agreement evolves.

The first axis is derived from Moskos' (1977) opposition of institution versus occupation. The armed forces have always been an instrument of state formation and in this respect contributed to national identity. Often but not always conscription was part of state building. In this respect it makes sense that armed forces and military families were institutionalized. In a comparative endeavor, such as presented in this book, one can clearly demonstrate the evident differences between countries. Brazil, for example, is more institutional compared to Portugal and many other Western countries that have a

more occupational upmake. Differences in geography, in risk perception and tasking of the military define the contours of this institution-occupation divide. Finland and the Baltic states because the imminent threat of a neighboring country do also show institutional tendencies, albeit, just as in South America, in modern forms. Therefore relocation of servicemen is, as discussed in the chapter on Finland, a source of tensions. Sweden on the contrary is highly occupational in upmake and the implication for military families goes so far that 'military families' do not exist. In Sweden there are families of soldiers, but no military families. Swedes don't identify with the 'military family' concept. Care provisions are within the normal arrangements the welfare state already provides so the armed forces do not have to and are not allowed to act like the old fashioned patriarch. The axis institution versus occupation thus works out differently on the family triads in all these different countries. The interplay between the three levels society, organization, family is thus also constituted differently. The resulting micro, macro, meso contracts are thus also different.

The axis self-help versus family arrangements does not necessarily correlate with the axis institutional versus occupational. In some countries the state and/or the organization provides support as part of the tripartite contract between families, the armed forces and state. In some countries people resort to their families. In others it is up to individual initiative to take care for one self. Culture, tradition, geography and infrastructure do play a role in the differences between countries, but also the fact that in some countries the armed forces are peripheral or core institutions. Negotiations along this axis determine the outcomes. Some countries have, despite appearances, mixed models. The United States of America and Canada are both individualist countries

where individual responsibility is the credo, but they do acknowledge and value community service and local leadership stepping in into care arrangements that often also are private community initiatives. Along this axis we also elaborated on the concept of work-family conflict and support arrangements. One of the findings is that the tensions between military and family not only result from time, strain, or behavior, but also, as Masson explains, from deeply rooted beliefs on gender roles. This is exemplified in the chapters on fatherhood and child rearing.

The third axis 'command' versus 'negotiation households' refers to a general development whereby families cannot automatically be coerced, nor can family members be bossed around at will. Violence in the family, as described in the Australian case, is legally banned in all nations in our sample. Like the French-Russian comparison pointed out, the work that is being done by army wives is still 'free labor' and the logic of exploitation still applies, but things gradually are changing. The experience South American soldiers had with peace keeping in Haiti still proves that the burden of emotion work lies on families who are supporting the deployed soldiers. But all this is less and less taken for granted. Negotiation with the family is outside the chain of command, so there is always the question how families are co-opted into the system, or not. The United Kingdom and the United States of America still provide military housing and thus still have a strong impact on family life, but even though this is the case, more subtle ways of political work are required. Command households and coercion no longer enjoy legitimacy and states and organizational authorities will have to succumb to seduction.

Seductive capital

Bourdieu coined the concept of symbolic violence and Connell that of the gender regime. Concepts like these, and especially the manner in which Elias defined habitus as second nature, help us understand why the greedy institutions concept, although still valid in essence, is no longer sufficient as a tool in understanding military families. Politics of Military Families analyses the political processes of negotiation and contract forging that results in a figuration where the occupational, the self-help arrangement, and the negotiation household seem to point in the direction of the emergent structuring of modern military families. Spruce (in the book Politics of Military Families) rightly remarks "The power relationships could change once partners become aware and use their unrecognized power, and rather than just being a victim of symbolic violence they could become a reciprocal source" of symbolic capital. Modern love is accommodated within these structures and all agents within the triad are seduced to play their part with or without knowing what that part exactly is, what the larger structure is and how they are exploited to serve the objectives of state and military organizations. Since coercion has lost legitimacy, cooperation, consciously or unconsciously is brought about by cooption and seduction. Those who hold more seductive capital (benefits, kindliness, support) are able to bestow existing systems, i.e. the military family as auxiliary to the armed forces organization, its sustainability. The nice and friendly organization is helping out military families, but the help is not altruistically motivated. It serves the organization's interests.

References

Andres, M. D. and Moelker, R. (2010). Sweethearts or strangers? Couples'
reconciliation following military deployment. In M. Andres, *Behind family lines.
Family members' adaptations to military-induced separations* (Doctoral
dissertation, pp. 147–176). Breda, Netherlands: Broese & Peereboom.

DeAngelis, K. and Segal, M. (2015). Transitions in the military and the family as
greedy institutions: Original concept and current applicability. In R. Moelker, M.
Andres, G. Bowen, and P. Manigart (Eds.) *Military families and war in the 21st
century. Comparative perspectives* (pp. 22-42). London: Routledge.

Boyd, D., and Ellison, N. (2008). Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *13*, 210-230.

Carter, S. P. and Renshaw, K. D. (2016). Communication via different media during
military deployments and post deployment relationship satisfaction. *Military
Behavioral Health, 4*(3), 260–268.

Coyne, J. C. and Smith, D. A. (1991). Couples coping with a myocardinal infarction: A
contextual perspective on wives' distress. *Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 61*, 404-412.

Ender, M. G. (1995). G.I. phone home: The use of telecommunications by the soldiers
of Operation Just Cause. *Armed Forces & Society, 21*, 435–454.

Fromm, (1956). *The Art of Loving*. New York: Harper and Row.

Hofstede, G. H. (1991) *Cultures and Organizations. Software of the Mind*. McGraw
Hill, London.

Joseph, A. L. and Afifi, T. D. (2010). Military wives' stressful disclosure to their

    deployed husbands: The role of protective buffering. *Journal of Applied*

    Communication Research, 38, 412–434.

The 36 Questions That Lead to Love (NYT)

Moelker, R., Soeters, J., and Hagen, U. vom (2007). Sympathy, the cement of

    interoperability. Findings on ten years of German-Netherlands military cooperation.

    Armed Forces & Society, 33, 496-517.

Moskos, C. (1977). From institution to occupation: Trends in military organization.

    Armed Forces & Society, 31(1), 388-401.

Perel, E. (2017). *The state of affairs: Rethinking infidelity*. London: Hodder and

    Stoughton General Division.

Suls, J., Green, P., Rose, G., Lounsbury, P., and Gordon, E. (1997). Hiding worries

    from one's spouse: Associations between coping via protective buffering and

    distress in male post-myocardial infarction patients and their wives. *Journal of*

    Behavioral Medicine, 20(4), 333–349.

Schumm, W.R., Bell, D.B., Ender, M.G., & Rice, R.E. (2004). Expectations, use, and

    evaluation of communication media among deployed peacekeepers. *Armed Forces*

    & Society, 30, 649–662.

Swaan, A. de (1982). Uitgaansbeperking en uitgaansangst. Over de verschuiving van

    bevelshuishouding naar onderhandelingshuishouding. [A ban on going out may lead

    to fear for the streets. The shift from command household to negotiation household],

    in A. de Swaan (ed.), *De mens is de mens een zorg*. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 81-

    115.

Military and Family in Transition:

negotiating symbolic boundaries

Manon Andres and René Moelker

Faculty of Military Sciences, Netherlands Defense Academy / Netherlands

---

Introduction

"Once it was simple: men worked and most women stayed at home to raise the children."[1] The new reality is more complex. Social, demographical, and technological developments have contributed to changes in both the family and work domains and bring new challenges and pressures in the work-family interface (see, for instance, Andres, Moelker, and Soeters, 2011; De Angelis and Segal, 2015; Moelker, Andres, Bowen, and Manigart, 2015). In the context of these changes, this paper 1) briefly discusses power dynamics in and between the family and the military, 2) explores how military personnel manage the boundaries of work and family life and 3) considers the challenge of initiatives that aim to support personnel in navigating work and family life.

Power dynamics in and between the family and the military

In many countries, we witness social, demographical, and cultural changes that affect

family structures and dynamics. Women accounting for an increasing proportion of the labor force, a growing number of dual-income families, an increasing role of men in the domestic sphere, an increasing number of people combining paid labor with the care for minor children and elderly parents (the sandwich generation), and more diverse family structures (including single-parent families, 'blended' or 'patchwork' families, and families based on same-sex unions), are but a few developments that shape and alter negotiation processes within the family domain. We witness a shift from command households to negotiation households (De Swaan, 1982), which represents shifting power dynamics, from 'father's will is law' to family members (not only partners but also children) being more equal political agents in the family diplomatic system (Moelker, Rones, and Andres, in press). Often with two careers taking into account, family members negotiate the conditions and boundaries of work and family life. In that respect, families of military personnel may not be different from any other family, were it not for the fact that they face unique challenges in their connectedness to the military.

The military, with its socialization processes, culture, and hierarchy, represents unique power structures. Among other things, the military exerts power in controlling employees' careering structures, and decisions pertaining to who to deploy, or who to relocate when and where – which affect employees and families in various ways, including their decisions where to live, spouse employment, family plans, relationships, and well-being (Moelker, Andres, and Rones, in press). In combination with the nature of the job, performed in unusual circumstances, with real risks to get (physically or mentally) injured, the military profession differs from other occupations. Moreover, the military can legitimately withdraw leave and demand the presence of

their employees; and in some countries such as in the Netherlands, unlike civilian employees, military personnel are not allowed to go on strike. It reflects a 'contract of unlimited liability' between service members and the state (Dandeker, Wessely, Iversen, and Ross, 2006).

For its performance, the military is dependent on its members and their families. Inherent to all relationships, the mechanism of 'give and take' (reciprocity) plays a powerful role in the military-employee-family triad. [2] Military personnel are willing to make sacrifices (e.g., being away from their family for a period of time), they negotiate what sacrifices are acceptable for the family, but – in accordance with the principles of social exchange theory

– they do want something in return, such as recognition and support. Costs and rewards will be evaluated, and a positive outcome will maintain the status quo. Tensions, or perceptions of imbalance, may result in changes to the status quo; for instance, military personnel may attempt to restore the balance and attain a more positive outcome for the family by leaving the military. According to the family-relatedness of work decisions (Greenhaus and Powell, 2012), family members play an important role in individuals' decisions to stay in or leave the job; among other things, their power lies in their attitudes and support (e.g., Pluut and Andres, in press). Tensions in the military-employee-family triad have shown to affect not only organization outcomes, but also employee well-being and outcomes in the family domain (e.g., Andres, Moelker, Soeters, 2012a/b; Moelker, Andres, and Rones, in press).

Negotiating the boundaries of family and military life

The struggle to reconcile work and family life seems a universal phenomenon nowadays but may even be more pronounced among military personnel and their families because of the unique set of demands and challenges they face. Whereas work and family have long been considered separate domains in life, their boundaries have become more symbolic and blurred, which creates new challenges. Technological developments, such as smartphones and constant email and internet connection, allow people to be available anytime, anywhere; for work and the family, without boundaries. Although this may provide individuals more flexibility in reconciling work and family life (e.g., bringing the kids to school, do some work in the evening or weekend), it also makes it difficult to *unplug* from work or family responsibilities and may create pressures of *permanent availability*, which leads to a greater struggle to negotiating the boundaries of work and family life (e.g., Hislop et al., 2015; Major and Germano, 2006). Questions how individuals handle availability across the boundaries of life domains and how they maintain, negotiate, and transition across "the socially constructed lines of demarcation between work and family" and reconcile these domains in life have gained interest in science and practice (Allen, Cho, and Meier, 2014: 100).

Boundary theory (Nippert-Eng, 1996) suggests that individuals manage the boundaries of work and family life through processes of segmenting and/or integrating the domains, referring to the degree to which one domain (e.g., work) is kept separate from the other domain (e.g., family) (Kreiner 2006). Some individuals prefer that work and family life are kept separate (or segmented) and construct boundaries to ensure

that the domains remain separate from one another (e.g., they refrain from discussing work-related problems with their partner at home or sharing family matters with coworkers). Others construct boundaries that are not as strong so that the domains can be interconnected, or integrated (e.g., handling family matters while being at work or engaging in work-related email communication after work hours). Modern communication technologies have provided new means of managing work and personal life boundaries. Central to boundary management is the idea of individuals' agency to continually shape and manage the boundaries, taking into account the specific character of the work and home domain. Whereas segmentation may provide clarity between the domains (e.g., now it's works time), it may hinder smooth transitions between the domains (e.g., being confronted with family issues while being at work, or family-reintegration processes after returning from deployment). Integration may facilitate smoother transitions between work and family life, but the domains also become more blurred, which may result in constantly juggling work and family responsibilities (e.g., Ashforth, Kreiner, and Fugate, 2000). Many variations exist on the segmentation-integration continuum.

Literature on this topic in a military context is scarce (or even non-existent). As suggested earlier, the struggle to reconcile work and family life may be more pronounced among military personnel and their families because of the unique set of demands and challenges they face. How do they balance and manage the boundaries of work and personal life? Even when military personnel are physically separated from their family (e.g., in times of deployment), through (modern) communication technologies, family life is likely to intrude the military arena, while military life enters the living room (Moelker et al, 2015).

Empirical findings from a survey among Dutch Navy personnel being deployed at sea ($N = 351$) reveal that, in general, the deployed service members report moderate levels of segmentation/integration preferences and behaviors (mean segmentation preferences = 2.96 (on a 1 – 5 scale), $SD = 0.68$, mean segmentation behaviors = 2.93, $SD = 0.61$).[3] The scores of 32% indicate higher integration preferences, 28% indicate higher segmentation preferences, and 40% reside somewhere in between. Interestingly, lower proportions of deployed military personnel seem to (be able to) put their preferences into practice, as the scores of 23% indicate higher integration *behaviors* (compared to 32% indicating higher integration *preferences*), the scores of 17% indicate higher segmentation *behaviors* (compared to 28% indicating higher segmentation *preferences*), and 60% reside somewhere in between.

Deployed service members' boundary management strategies – representing their agency to shape and manage the boundaries of work and family life, within the particular conditions – were correlated with their communication with their homefront and family-to-work interference while being deployed. Those who preferred to keep work and family life separate (i.e., whose scores indicated higher segmentation preferences and behaviors) communicated significantly less frequently with their home front (by all means of communication) compared with those who favored more integration between work and private life. Moreover, those who preferred to keep work and family life separate, were more likely to engage in protective reticence while communicating with their homefront, that is, they were more likely not to share everything with their homefront and leave work at work (Andres and Moelker, in press). Further, those who scored higher on segmentation preferences and behaviors reported less family-to-work interference, thus less spillover from family to work.

Challenging the work and family myths

At the macro and meso level, governmental and organizational attempts are made to support employees (and their families) in navigating and managing work and family life.

For instance, in September 2016, the European Parliament adopted the resolution 'Creating labor market conditions favorable for work-life balance',[4] which stresses that *reconciliation of professional, private and family life needs to be guaranteed as a fundamental right for all people*. [5] In their intentions to enable social and professional well-being and to be supportive in navigating work and family life, many organizations have developed policies, programs, and benefits, including, among other things, flexible working arrangements and a variety of family-related types of leave (e.g., maternity leave, paternity leave, parental leave, and carers' leave).

In addition, and with variations between countries, military organizations offer support to military employees and their families as part of the military covenant (see Moelker et al., 2008 and Moelker, Andres, Bowen, and Manigart, 2015 for international descriptions and comparisons on 'military family support'). Countries adopted Veterans Initiatives (e.g., U.K) or a Veterans Law (the Netherlands) that guide and dictate initiatives aimed to support (former) military personnel and their families and facilitate their ability to manage work-family issues.

However, developing policies to comply with government regulation is not sufficient; structural changes only work in concert with cultural change and

challenging the taken-for-granted myths and logics, including "the hegemony of the ideal worker who is expected to place the work role ahead of the family or personal life role at all times" (Kossek, Lewis, and Hammer, 2010: 5; Rapoport et al., 2002). In the context of the (social, demographical, technological) changes, mentioned earlier, support needs, expectations, and preferences will be diverse and in constant change.

Conclusion

With the boundaries of work and family becoming more symbolic and blurred, negotiating these boundaries and managing the pressures of permanent availability (for work and family) seems a common challenge in modern societies, but may even be more pronounced among military personnel and their families because of the particularities of military life. While being deployed at sea, Dutch Navy personnel showed diverse boundary management strategies (ranging from and between segmentation and integration preferences and behaviors; representing their agency to shape and manage the boundaries of work and family life, within the particular conditions). Their boundary management strategies were correlated with their communication with their homefront and perceived spillover from family to work. Whereas attempts are made to support employees (and their families) in navigating and managing work and family life, interventions will only be effective in conjunction with cultural change and challenging the taken-for-granted myths and logics. Moreover, support needs, expectations, and preferences are diverse and in constant change. Different forces and (power) dynamics at the micro, meso, and macro level play a role.[6]

References

Allen, T.D., Cho, E., and Meier, L.L. (2014). Work-family boundary dynamics. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 1*, 99-121.

Andres, M. and Moelker, R. (in press). What happens on board stays on board? The political game of communication between deployed military personnel and their loved ones. In Moelker, R., Andres, M., and Rones, N. (Eds.) *The politics of military families. Tensions between state, work organizations and the rise of the negotiation household.* London: Routledge.

Andres, M., Moelker, R., and Soeters, J. (2011). Behind Family Lines. *Res Militaris, 2*(1), 2011.

Andres, M., Moelker, R., and Soeters, J. (2012a). A longitudinal study of partners of deployed personnel from the Netherlands' Armed Forces, *Military Psychology, 4*(3), 270-288.

Andres, M., Moelker, R., and Soeters, J. (2012b). The work-family interface and turnover intentions over the course of project-oriented assignments abroad. *International Journal of Project Management*, *30*(7), 752-759.

Ashforth, B.E., Kreiner, G.E., and Fugate, M. (2000). All in a day's work: Boundaries and micro role transitions. *The Academy of Management Review, 25*(3), 472-491.

Dandeker, C., Wessely, S., Iversen, A. and Ross, J. (2006) What's in a name? Defining and caring for 'veterans': the UK in international perspective, *Armed Forces & Society*, *32*(2), 161–77.

De Angelis, K. and Segal, M. (2015) Transitions in the military and the family as greedy institutions: Original concept and current applicability. In Moelker, R., Andres, M., Bowen, G., and Manigart, P. (Eds) *Military families and war in the 21st*

century. Comparative perspectives. London: Routledge, pp. 22-42.

Doward, J. (21 January 2017) *Men and women struggle to get on at work and find time for their families.* The Observer/The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/jan/22/fatherhood-penalty- balance-work-family-life-millennial-men.

Greenhaus, J.H. and Powell, G.N. (2012). The family relatedness of work decisions: A framework and agenda for theory and research. *Journal of Vocational Behavior, 80,* 246-255.

Hislop, D., Axtell, C., Collins, A., Daniels, K., Glover, J., and Niven, K. (2015). Variability in the use of mobile ICTs by homeworkers and its consequences for boundary management and social isolation. *Information and Organization, 25*(4), 222-232.

Kossek, E.E., Lewis, S., and Hammer, L.B. (2010). Work-life initiatives and organizational change: Overcoming mixed messages to move from the margin to the mainstream. *Human Relations, 63*(1), 3-19.

Kreiner, G.E. (2006). Consequences of work-home segmentation or integration: A person-environment fit perspective. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 27*(4), 485–507.

Major, D.A. and Germano, L.M. (2006). The changing nature of work and its impact on the work-home interface. In Jones, F., Burke, R.J., and Westman, M. (Eds.), *Work-life balance: A psychological perspective.* New York, NY, US: Psychology Press., pp. 13-38.

Moelker, R., Andres, M., Bowen, G., and Manigart, P. (Eds) (2015) *Military families and war in the 21st century. Comparative perspectives.* London: Routledge.

Moelker, R., Andres, M., Bowen, G., and Manigart, P. (2015). Introduction. In Moelker, R., Andres, M., Bowen, G., and Manigart, P. (Eds) *Military families and war in the 21st century. Comparative perspectives*. London: Routledge, pp. 3-21.

Moelker, R., Andres, M., and Rones, N. (Eds.) (in press) *The politics of military families. Tensions between state, work organizations and the rise of the negotiation household.* London: Routledge.

Moelker, R., Poot, G., Andres, M., Jelusic, L., Juvan, J., Parmar, L., and Tomforde, M. (2008). News from the home front: Communities supporting military families. In: Caforio, Kümmel, Bandana (Eds.). *Armed forces and conflict resolution: Sociological perspectives*. Bingley, UK: Emerald, pp. 187-214.

Moelker, R., Rones, N., and Andres, M. (in press). Introduction: The politics of military families and the rise of the negotiation household. Tensions between state, work and families. In Moelker, R., Andres, M., and Rones, N. (Eds.) *The politics of military families. Tensions between state, work organizations and the rise of the negotiation household*. London: Routledge.

Nippert-Eng, C. (1996). *Home and work: Negotiating boundaries through everyday life*. London: University of Chicago Press.

Pluut, H. and Andres, M. (in press). The influence of work-family experiences during deployment on organizational outcomes. In Moelker, R., Andres, M., and Rones, N. (Eds.) *The politics of military families. Tensions between state, work organizations and the rise of the negotiation household*. London: Routledge.

Rapoport, R., Bailyn, L., Fletcher, J.K., and Pruitt, B.H. (2002). *Beyond work- family balance: Advancing gender equity and workplace performance*. London: Jossey Bass.

Swaan, A. de (1982). Uitgaansbeperking en uitgaaansangst. Over de verschuiving van bevelshuishouding naar onderhandelingshuishouding. [A ban on going out may lead to fear for the streets. The shift from command household to negotiation household], in A. de Swaan (ed.), *De mens is de mens een zorg*. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, pp. 81-115.

Notes

---

[1] Doward, J. (21 January 2017) Men and women struggle to get on at work and find time for their families. The Observer/The Guardian.

[2] A triadic approach is proposed as a framework for understanding modern military families, see Moelker, Andres, and Rones (Eds.), in press.

[3] Among other things, those with higher segmentation preferences and behaviors do not like family matters to enter their work domain, want to keep their family life at home, try to keep work and family life separate, and report a clear distinction in their life between work and their role as family member.

[4] https://eyf2014.wordpress.com.

[5] http://www.europarl.europa.eu.

[6] See proposed framework in Moelker, Andres, and Rones (Eds.), in press

Far from the Frontlines: Locating intersections between gender, ethnicity and family in the Philippine Army

Rosalie Arcala Hall

University of the Philippines Visayas/ Philippines

Introduction

The Philippine military, as a predominantly male and Christian all-volunteer force, reflects much of the traditional moorings of Philippine society from which it gets recruits. Focused on internal security tasks, its personnel are mainly deployed for long periods of time to confront Muslim and secessionist threats in far flung areas. Military families were seen by the institution primarily in terms of their legal connections to the military personnel, for purposes of determining eligibility for government mandated-benefits and pensions. Beyond this, the social network of military dependents and families rests on the AFP Officers Ladies Club Inc. (and their branch equivalent), which organizes events and disseminates information to dependents. Patterned along traditional gender lines (male military personnel and female spouse) and mimicking the military hierarchy in terms of leadership, the Ladies Club ran and operated a private primary school near the main camp in Manila, in the absence of military-provided educational facilities.

With the opening of regular commissions and the recruitment of enlisted women in 1994, progressive changes have been made equalizing admission, training, promotion

between males and females, at the same bringing the military institution to the same standards in matters of marriage and maternity benefits as other government civilian agencies. Some years after, the army integration program, which was one of the components of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was carried out. The integration scheme involved the individual-based absorption of 5,750 ex-MNLF combatants and their proxies to Army units that were primarily deployed in the Mindanao Bangsamoro theatre. The program substantially increased the number of Muslim officers and enlistees, and provided grounds for the Army to adopt a more culture-sensitive training and personnel policy.

This article examines how military families interact with the Philippine armed forces as an institution, by outlining relevant policies and describing the practices of Army officers and enlistees who are married, have children or plan to have a family. It draws from findings of research projects undertaken by the author: Toyota Foundation Southeast Asian Research and Exchange Program (SEASREP)-funded study on Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Falintil integrees into the Philippine and East Timorese security forces in 2008-2009; East Asian Development Network (EADN)-funded project on women in the Philippine army and police in 2010-2011; and Philippine Army-commissioned project on the status of army women integration in 2017-2018. The first project featured data form interviews of key military and MNLF officers involved in drawing up and implementing the integration scheme and 2 focus group discussions with MNLF integree officers and enlisted men from the 6th Infantry Division in Maguindanao province. The second project generated data through 16 focus group discussions (FGD) with female Army officers/ enlisted women/ Women

Auxiliary Corps and female police commissioned and non-commissioned officers in Mindanao-based army and police units. The third project entailed 12 interviews of personnel/operations and commanding officers at battalion, brigade and general headquarter levels, and 32 separate FGDs with male and female officers and enlisted personnel from the Army headquarters, special forces and select infantry units throughout the country.

Military Families: Some Conceptual Handles

The nature of military work places demands on its personnel's families. Long periods of separation on account of deployment, frequent travels and relocation and risks from combat are said to produce conflicts with their families (Franke 2006, 6: Andres, Moelker & Soeters 2012, 754; Smith & Rosenstein 2017; Wadsworth & Southwell 2011, 170). This work-family conflict is said to influence decisions by military personnel to quit (Andres et al., 2012, 754), puts families to high risks for negative outcomes in terms of health and well-being (Wadsworth & Southwell 2011, 166) and is an exogenous source of family stress (Trail et al. 2017, 2133; Burrell et al. 2006; Vuga & Juvan 2013, 1070). The military is seen as a greedy institution placing exceptional demand on family members (Vuga and Juvan 2013, 1060). Spouses in particular are adversely affected because they could only get part-time jobs, unable to pursue their careers to the fullest, unable to put on community roots, and without support network for reporting or addressing abuse (Burrell et al., 2006). It is also gendered because it is more challenging to military women who wants to be married and have children (Smith & Rosenstein 2017, 261). The intensity of work-family conflict is said to vary

depending on the frequency and period of time the military personnel is separated from his/her family, but also becomes less of a problem once both parties adjust to the lifestyle (Cadigan 2006, 13).

Given this crucial link, measures are necessary to reduce work-family conflict. These include: providing good communications between the military personnel and the home front, family-friendly culture in the work space, and social support from family and friends (Andres, Moelker & Soeters 2012). Formal institutional support provided by the military institution (hence, funded) are as important as informal institutional support from friends (Vuga & Juvan 2013, 1070). Along this line, the US Department of Defense pro-vides an array of family-friendly compensation packages to entice recruits (Cadigan 2006). These include allowances that offset housing and relocation costs due to travel and deployment, commissary privileges and family service support centers, including infra-structure such as child care and schools (Lietz et al. 2013, 187). Equivalent family support services are also provided by states for reserves who are deployed (Harrion 2006, 562). Because these packages are linked to family status, the policy encourages more members to take on family obligations, further driving up government expenditure.

The gendered aspects of work-family conflict are pronounced. Military women, to the extent that they adhere to a traditional gender ideology, delay marriage and having children as they try to advance their careers, or quit the military to start a family (Smith & Rosenstein 2017, 274). The results of the study by Smith & Rosenstein (2017), however pointed out that no relationship exists between gender attitude of military women and years of intended service, nor with decision to having more children. The explanation for this is that women who join the military already understand the

organisation's hierarchical and masculine culture, and thus able to strategies their way into reaching their career goals and reckoning with their planned family life. Those who do not, self-select and choose other jobs. Family benefits where provided by government are also based on a normative family type of a male military personnel and female spouse (Smith & Rosenstein 2017, 274). Military men of traditional gender ideology therefore are privileged by these institutional arrangements.

Military Families and the Philippine Military: An Ambiguous Relationship

In the Philippine context, studies on the link between military and families focus on the consequences of integrating women and ex-rebels into the armed forces. While the proportion of female officers and personnel have changed little compared to the prior Women Auxiliary Corps (1%-2% of the force), the entry of women as regular officers and enlistees prompted serious reforms in the military's human resource policies. As more military women are taken in, the organization had to deal with personnel fill-up and rotation challenges for those in maternity leave. While the Philippine military maintains in-paper that all occupational specialities are open to women (including combat) and that women personnel could be deployed in frontline units, in practice most women are given combat roles, nor readily assigned to field units due largely to commander's discretion (Hall, 2017). Female enlistees who are integrees into the Philippine Army self-select into the military profession understanding its highly masculine culture, but also do not plan to stay long if they intend to have a family (Hall 2016). The absorption of Muslim integrees into the army creates parallel pressures. The

army has to amend its rules on beneficiaries to take into account multiple marriages and children from these marriages by Muslim army personnel.

The military's break from an exclusively male organization (with females as auxiliaries) to having females as regulars came about as a legal imperative. In line with the Women in Development Act (Republic Act 7192) and Magna Carta for Women (Republic Act 9710), the Philippine military opened its regular commission and enlisted personnel to women, and institutionally, commit to a minimum recruitment threshold and to progressively increase the number (up to a target of 20%) in the future. As the law covers all government agencies, the military has to benchmark its progress in gender mainstreaming by guaranteeing equality of treatment (entry requirements, training, promotion, etc.) and ex-tending protection to women personnel, particularly against sexual abuses. This is magnified further by the government requirement that 5% of the military's budget must be spent for gender and development, a task which took to mean a lot of catch-up in providing facilities such as toilets, billeting and child care.

Under the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Code of Ethics, families are seen as integral part of the soldiers' and officers' lives. In its Creed, the family is identified as one of the key social institutions:

> Family Life – The AFP shall recognize that its members are human being with the same family obligations as other people. It shall therefore support activities that will strengthen husband-wife, parents-children, and family-community relationship; provides facilities conducive to a wholesome home and community

life and protect military dependents especially minors, from exploitation and drug abuse (section 2.1.1.)

Along this line, the recognition of families as indispensable elements to military career milestones, deployments/return or deaths are captured in the following sections: Welcome/Farewell Tendered to a Newly Assigned/Departing Officer – A newly assigned officer is tendered a welcome party while prior to the departure of an officer from his station on a change of assignment, a farewell party is tendered. Other suitable unit function is usually given by the unit's officers and ladies in honor of the newly assigned/departing officer and his family (section 4.10); Survivor Assistance to Bereaved Family – When any member of a unit dies, an officer is immediately designated by the commanding officer to render every possible assistance to the bereaved Family. A family courtesy may be tendered, if desired, in the case of death of a member of any personnel's family (section 4.23.).

The Code of Ethics contains references to families in the context of corruption. The following actions involving families are deemed corrupt: Allowing/tolerating military spouses and dependents or dummies to deal or participate and any form of transactions with the AFP including but not limited to biddings and the like. (section 4.4.5.); Utilization/disposition/employment of AFP material resources for personal/family use including but not limited to vehicles, office supplies, POL products and the like (section 4.4.7.).

Similarly, under the Guidelines in the Disposition of Domestic Related Offenses of AFP Personnel, "…the AFP commits itself to maintain an environment free from any

form of domestic related offenses involving its personnel. This can be achieved through the AFP's active endeavor to resolve all domestic/marital cases promptly for the *reservation of the sanctity of the family and the career of its personnel.* [italics mine].

The Philippine Army Manual 1 -15 (2014) reiterates rules covering military personnel family in the contexts of corruption, domestic violence and domestic/marital cases of abandonment or non-support. Examples of such rules are:

1. Personnel are prohibited to receive, directly or indirectly, any gift "regardless of value" in any occasion, given by reason of their official position, regardless of whether or not the same is for past favors or favors or the giver expects to receive a favor in the future from the personnel concerned in the performance of his/her official functions. The prohibition includes receiving of parties or entertainments from private individual or entity to include parties and entertainment intended *for personnel's family members or immediate relative.* [italics mine]

2. All personnel shall avoid conflict of interest at all times.They shall refrain from any activity which may place their positions and personal interests in conflict with that of the Army's interest/mission. Disclosure shall be made to PA or its Units/Offices if personnel or any of their immediate family members [italics mine] has or acquires property, benefits or interest by gift, inheritance from any supplier or who has an interest in supplier's business or is performing services in favor of any supplier. Such relationship shall be avoided as it has an appearance of potentially influencing personnel's judgments or activities.

The aforementioned discussion points to a bifurcated view of military families as essential support to military personnel and an insidious entity that can lead them astray. Military families are organised independently (e.g. Ladies' Club) to provide social support, with no funding from the military institution.

In practice, the military institution's dealing with personnel families extended only to matters of dispensing benefits (i.e. death, retirement and disability) and less on providing key infrastructure or services to them. This treatment is informed by cultural views which assumes traditional gender roles, i.e. the male military personnel is the breadwinner and the spouse is a female dependent. The family is also seen as a societal force impinging upon the task of effective soldiering, thereby the prohibitions on co-locating families in camps outside of key cities. Where family housing is provided, these usually are limited in number and only in the General Headquarters in Manila, in key Regional Commands or Infantry Divisions. Education and health services are only provided to personnel, and not to their families.

There are two offices which act as lynchpins in the military's interface with personnel families: Office of Ethical Standards and Public Accountability (OESPA) and the Office of Army Gender and Development (OAGAD). OESPA comes up with rules regarding family in the contexts of corruption, domestic violence and domestic/marital cases of abandonment or non-support. Its tasks unit commanders to enforce such rules. OAGAD deals with the implementation and monitoring of the organization's protocols on sexual harassment; and services for uniformed personnel and family welfare (i.e. health and educational referrals, child care). OAGAD also conducts Gender Sensitivity Training (GST) and is the anchor agency for ensuring that 5% of Army budget is spent for gender and development. These two offices are

relatively new and are playing catch up with the myriad of family-related issues confronted by its personnel.

Women and Nuancing Military Families

Since the integration of women into the Philippine military in 1994, policy changes were made which has a bearing on families. In line with the "equality" mandate of the two laws previously mentioned, female members were given the same terms for maternity leave/benefits as civilian government employees in 1995. The 3-year marriage ban for women was rescinded in 2008 (Memorandum from Chief of Staff dated 26 March 2008). In a 2006 memorandum, female line personnel were given equal classification (AFP Occupational Specialty, AFOS or Military Occupation Specialty, MOS) as the males; were allowed to be employed in administrative duties as well as combat, combat support, com-bat support service and security related activities; and to be assigned jobs in line with their chosen field of specialization including intelligence, Civil Military Operations (CMO), psychological operations, information systems and other fields. In principle, military women must now go through the same career milestones and hurdles as their male counter-parts, including mandatory rotation for officers and multi-year posting in frontline units such as those in the Army Infantry and Armor.

   After 1994, there had been more women recruited into the force although the over-all proportion of female's personnel remain low (2.6% of total strength, with a higher pro-portion among officers at 9.7%, than enlistees at 2%). With the rescinding of the 3-year marriage ban for women in 2008 (Memorandum from Chief of Staff dated 26

March 2008), many military women marry within 5 years of their entry. Because women are left to care for their children, this has put pressure on the military institution to provide family services, e.g. housing and co-location with husbands also in the military service. While uniformed women in principle can be assigned jobs in combat, combat support and combat support service, the dearth of adequate housing facilities in the frontline has prevented many from taking on assignments or for commanders to take them in. As a result, many uniformed women end up at posts in Division headquarters, Philippine Army Headquarters in Manila or in training schools located in urban centers, where housing options are avail-able.

The exodus of married military women officers to safe posts is reflected in the staffing patterns. Data provided by Philippine Army Personnel Management Unit (PAMU) reveal that the distribution of female officers is eschewed, with more placed in units that are stationed in the General Headquarters or in garrisons. Most female officers are at the Army Reserve Command (in Manila) while the highest proportion of enlisted women are in Civil Military Operations Group (16%), and Army Support Command (11.9%), both in Manila, and Training and Doctrines Command (13.9%) based in Capas, Tarlac (an urban regional center).

Why women officers and enlistees gravitate towards posting in Manila or big urban centers is partly brought about by the dearth of family housing within Army camps. The Philippine Army being deployed for internal security missions, no family housing is available in frontline units below Infantry Division headquarters. Family housing has only been made available in large numbers at the Philippine Army Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio, Manila and in Tarlac and Nueva Ecija following the relocation of army units (the military estate in Manila was sold) beginning late 1990s. There is also a standing

regulation prohibiting civilian housing within or in nearby military camps, for security reasons. The old pattern of male officers and enlistees rotating among these mission areas without their families also did not create any demand. In some Divisions visited by the author in line with research projects, there was a female officer with her child, and child care provider who were housed in a dorm-type facility (one room for them); others are staying at Army transient quarters. The author has only visited one Division headquarters, where there were about 50 family-type housing (townhouses) for enlistees, built with the initiative of a previous commander.

The tendency for uniformed women to locate themselves in safe posts is also related to access to educational services for their children. Because the Army does not provide for educational services for the children, uniformed women have to seek these services independently. There is one elementary school in the Philippines Army headquarters ran by the Ladies Club, and child-minding centers for pre-school children (mandated by law). The institution of a Philippine Army Office of Gender and Development (PA-OAGAD) has only recently made these issues visible to the Army Command. In 2017, the PA OAGAD completed a family needs survey of personnel in Infantry Divisions to surface these issues.

Once married and with children, the utilization of female personnel becomes more subject to commander discretion. At their Divisional posting (initial for officers; perma-nent for enlistees), how the females are utilized depends in large part on the commander's discretion. Beyond the mandatory maternity and parental leave, it is entirely under the commander's discretion whether to assign female officers to lead an Infantry unit or assign them staff positions; to give field assignment or pull the females out from the field (on ac-count of pregnancy or if they were caring for an infant or a

little child). In the research project, the author encountered at least 4 different articulations of this discretionary power by commanders themselves. There are conservative types who thinks females should be protected and away from danger; the patriarchal type who only considers women appropriate for certain stereotyped jobs; the risk-averse who is worried about implications to his career if the female in field posting is killed or wounded; or the liberal kind who is open to assigning females to non-traditional tasks in mixed gender groups as short-term experiments. The commander's disposition towards family demands of his/her female personnel is nuanced by these mindsets.

Between a rock and a hard place: dealing with work-family conflicts

The gendered reality of task assignment and locational positing is something that many female officers interviewed for the project are very much aware about. At the be-ginning of their career, many already are aware about informal career restrictions and potential bottlenecks and strategize accordingly. This include planning when to marry, have children and raising them within the career requirements of rotational posting and extend-ed deployments. There is also the pressure for "career alignment"— that one goes through the checklist of QRS within reasonable time. The enlisted women subjects did not appear to be as motivated about becoming non-commissioned officers and staying long in the army. Many are married or looking forward to marrying. Among those interviewed for this project, the primary consideration appears to be their civil status or family condition, not career advancement per se. Depending on where they get

assigned (comfortable Divisional headquarters or operational units) seem to also influence career prospect.

The succeeding discussion illustrates the key decision points to a military woman's career.   The officers initial posting in one Division lasts from 5-7 years, which also coincides with the period when they marry and have children (23-29 years old). Once married or have children, they exercise greater agency with respect to posting or unit assignment. Many female officers mentioned that "baby project" was a top priority for a while, necessitating greater effort to co-locate with the husband as much as possible. After having children, the next key decision was where to "set up house," with child care being a critical need. Because reassignment is normal within 3-5-year cycles, agency in decision making becomes more complicated as the female married officer has to also look out further considerations like educational institutions for children, etc. Not surprisingly, many of the officers interviewed for the project were in practice, single mothers in care of their school-age children; the husbands are invariably not co-located. As such, when the female officers are in the lookout for next reassignment, they want to be in units situated in big camps near an urban center. As a rule of thumb, these have better billeting facilities and off-camp options, but the quality goes down in operational units (Brigade down).

Given these challenges, most female officers endure or make do. Many interviewed say it's a "sacrifice"; of those who are unable to be with their children, they feel guilty or conflicted. A key impetus to seek reassignment elsewhere is co-location with husband or with children. Given the Army's standing "guidance" against unit co-location (of married personnel and spouse both in the Army), one has to gamble on commander's discretion for a reassignment elsewhere which is a matter of officer-fill-

126

up requirement. In practice, the burden is placed on the personnel to request for a swap, i.e. to switch unit assignments provided that she finds somebody who will willingly take her place in the unit (male or female). For the female, assignment and geographical rotation takes on a more burden-some aspect precisely because they are in custody of their children. For enlisted women, there is less agency. With a stronger operational tempo, they must be assigned where they are needed. To illustrate, the First Scout Regiment downloads its enlisted women to battalions. However, there are more severe "reputational costs" to a lone unmarried female in a field unit than for a young female officer. According to one male Scout officer, many enlisted women in operations-inclined units are incentivised to marry soon and get out.

Family well-being is a key concern for many of the female officers and enlisted women. Decisions (tentative) on staying put in the Army is typically broken down in 10-year segments, and the 25-year minimum retirement threshold. Having a child, and school-age children under their care mediate that decision. Many of those who are close to the 25-year service minimum say that they want to quit in order to spend more time with their family.

The Army Integrees: Military Families from a Cultural Lens

In 1998, the army integrated 5,000 ex-Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) combatants and proxies as part of the peace agreement. While they comprise less than 3% of the force, the absorption of this influx of mostly Muslim integrees required changes in the guidelines for accessing family benefits, as under Philippine law, Muslims are allowed to have more than one wife. Given that most integrees are males

and are assigned to Mindanao-based home units, reconciling personnel data housed at the Infantry Divisions, with a centralised claims system has been quite a challenge.

As the Philippine Family Code also recognises legal claims by children borne outside of marriage (provided duly recognised by their fathers), the Philippine Army also has to adjust its rules accordingly to provide claims for child support and death benefits to children of army personnel. The internal deployment of army personnel makes illicit liaisons likely, thus producing added burden to the Office of the Adjutant General, which must address competing claims. This matter has been approached by the institution as a question of moral failure and a general weakening of the family unit among armed personnel. Division-based family values seminars and the like are being conducted by the OAGAD office to address these concerns.

The centrality of families among MNLF integrees is illustrated in narratives about their recruitment and motivation (Hall 2009). Many of the male Army integrees were proxies- sons, nephews or relatives- of MNLF combatants. Amongst those interviewed for the project, they articulate a distinction between themselves, whose MNLF families made "blood contributions" to the cause and those who became integrees by purchasing integration slots but whose families have no connection to the MNLF. The integrees also express pride over their status as soldiers and what they have accomplished materially (for their family) as a result of that. Being a soldier or having family members in the armed forces or police is also a source of family prestige.

Among the sub-set of female integrees (also proxies), the family's approval and keen support for them to join the Army was crucial in light of the traditional gender role-expectations of their culture (Hall 2016). Twenty-eight (28) enlisted women were

recruit-ed among ex-MNLF as part of the program only in 2008. Of the 11 female integrees inter-viewed for the project, many revealed the undue influence of their fathers and uncles with ties to the MNLF. They have come into the profession because they originate from families who already have male members in the armed services (police or army) or have sufficient family connections to enable them to get coveted slots for entry. The Muslim integrees face more daunting challenges compared to their non-Muslim cohorts. Muslim women had more trouble adjusting to Army life as the Army requires women members to subscribe to certain social behavior which a woman brought up as Muslim may find dis-concerting, such as manner of dressing. Like other enlisted women, many said they plan to quit the Army (a) upon marriage; (b) once they pay up their salary loan; or © when they acquire license to practice another profession (e.g. teaching).

Conclusion

Historically, the Philippine military treated families along the axis of traditional gender role templates— the male military personnel as income earner and the female spouse (plus children) as dependents. Family dependents are dealt by the institution in terms of eligibility for benefits and claims attached to the male military personnel. As officers and soldiers are deployed over long periods of time, and have multi-year rotations in various geographic regions of the country, their families are never co-located with them. Compounding this is the Army's policy against housing families in frontline units. Where housing is provided, it is in limited number in major camps in Manila and urban centers. The families, to the extent they are conspicuous, are present in the activities of

the Ladies Clubs in Camp Aguinaldo, Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Airbase which run socials and provide services such as child care and schools in these major camps. The Ladies Clubs are not funded by the military but vital informal links as its female spouses' leadership parallel the military hierarchy.

Treating military families from an arm's length stem partly from the armed forces' perspective that families influence individual personnel performance and motivations. The Code of Ethics articulates families as a source of corruption and moral failure. The strong influence of family in military career choice is illustrated among the Muslim army indegrees. Their MNLF-connected families were their ticket to enter the Army; that their being a soldier is a source of family prestige and therefore shape expectations of how their networks within the organization can be used to advance family goals. The military institution also bears the pressure of dealing with demands from abandoned and extra-marital families— children born out wedlock and their mothers.

The entry of military women in bigger numbers compelled the institution to make modifications in its personnel policies, as required by national legislation. These, however, were limited to policies dealing with maternity leave, equality of treatment (for benefits and claims) and guarantees for protection against sexual abuse in the workplace. Even with the 5% mandatory gender and development spending, expanding services for families/dependents is not a military priority (with the exception of providing day care ser-vices, which is required under the law). Because the military women themselves embody traditional gender ideology, their role as mothers and nurturers strongly inform decisions to remain or quit in the service. There is differentiated agency among female officers and enlistees. Female officers strategize by planning career requirements and timing their mar-riage and childbearing/child rearing

with spouse co-location and posting in units located at urban centers. Female enlistees, given their field unit posting, have fewer agency and therefore tend to quit early for family plans.

Substantial inroads have been made towards increasing the number of women in the Philippine Army, and providing them equal opportunities to pursue a career and move up the ranks. However, as most women recruited into the military subscribe to traditional gender roles (i.e. with desire to marry and have children), they face great challenges be-fore an institution which historically is designed for deployed military men, and uncolocated female spouse and dependents. The military's ambivalent stance towards families (as providing social support versus a corrupting influence for the troops) further limit the kind of institutional commitment. The military does not fund family services beyond member-based benefits and pensions, and will likely remain that way given the pervasive-ness of the traditional gender template among its personnel.

References

Andres, M., Moelker, R., and Soeters, J. (2012). The work–family interface and turnover intentions over the course of project-oriented assignments abroad. *International Journal of Project Management.* 30: 752–759.

Burrel, L. M., Adams, G. A., Durand, D, D. B, & Castro, C. A. (2006). The impact of military lifestyle demands on well-being, army, and family outcomes. *Armed Forces and Society.* 33,1: 43-58.

Cadigan, J. (2006). The impact of family-friendly compensation: an investigation of military personnel policy. *Review of Public Personnel Administration.* 26, 1: 3-20.

Franke, V. (2006). The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in stability operations. *International Journal of Peace Studies.* 11: 2, 5-25.

Hall, R.A. (2017) The Integration of Women in the Army: Twenty-three Years Hence. *The Philippine Army Journal.* 11,2: 16-29.

Hall, R.A. (2016).   Muslim Gender Narratives in the Philippine Army. *Res Militaris. Special ERGOMAS Issue n°2. Women in the Military* (February). http://resmilitaris.net

Hall, R.A. (2009). From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine and East Timorese Policy Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front and Falintil Combatants into theArmed Forces. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting. Toronto, Canada. September 3-6, 2009.

Harrion, D. (2006). The role of military culture in military organization's responses to woman abuse in military families. *The Sociological Review.* 54,3: 546-574.

Lietz, C. A., Stromwall, L. K., and Carlson, B. E. (2013). Women service members and family reintegration. *Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Social Services.* 94,3: 186-193.

Smith, D. G., and Rosenstein, J. E. (2017). Gender and the military profession: early career influences, attitudes, and intentions. *Armed Forces & Society.* 43,2: 260-279.

Trail, T. E., Meadows, S. O., Miles, J. N., and Karney, B. R. (2017). Patterns of vulnerabil-ities and resources in US military families. *Journal of Family Issues.* 38, 15: 2128-2149.

Vuga, J. and Juvan J. (2013). Work-family conflict between two greedy institutions – the family and the military. *Current Sociology.* 61(7): 1058-1077.

Wadsworth, S. M., and Southwell, K. (2011). Military families: Extreme work and ex-treme"work-family" *The Annals of the American Academy.* 636: 163-183.

Masculinity of Single/Married Soldiers:

The Cases of British Soldiers in Colonial India in the 19th Century

Taeko Uesugi

Senshu University/ Japan

I.   Introduction

The military force is said to be an institution which is based on the construction of soldiers' masculinity (Enloe 2000:16). However, masculinity as recognized or expected in the military is varied and not only related to combat potential or sexual orientation.

Many heroes who are renowned as superhuman combatants or in intelligence agencies are not married. Real military forces also employ young and single men by preference. It is supposed that marital status is among the constituents of masculinity on which military forces rely.

Is it only single soldiers that the military forces regard as desirable? Is soldiers' marital status relevant to the roles or the specific type of masculinity which is expected in the military force? If yes, what is the background for the relevance?

In order to clarify soldiers' marital status and the masculinity which is expected in the military forces, I examine the case of British soldiers in colonial India in the nineteenth century. Since there are many studies regarding Britons' marriage and family life in

colonial India, I would like to describe and analyse soldiers' marital status and masculinity by re-examining these secondary materials.

II. The Military Favours Single Soldiers

1. The British Army and colonial rule

It was the military force of the colonies, especially the Indian Army, which determined the fate of the British Empire (Tan 2005:23). The Friends of India (1874) reported that sixty thousand among one hundred and thirty thousand Europeans living in India were servicemen (Mizutani 2011:18-19)

2. The regulation of soldiers' marriage and the realities of married life

The British Army had already recognized in the middle of the Napoleonic Wars at the end of the eighteenth century that soldiers' families were a very important factor for manning and acquisition of staff, so they started welfare policies targeted at soldiers' families (Lin 2000). However, marriages were strictly regulated. Married soldiers without marriage permission were also dealt with as single soldiers, whose number was unknown (Hyam 1998[1990]:170).

Further, the social service in the nineteenth century was insufficient by contemporary standards. Military forces did not care the welfare of soldiers' wives and children very much. They were regarded as camp followers. Since garrisons with married quarters were so limited, even permitted wives often lived in barracks for single soldiers together with their husbands (Burroughs 1994:173). During transportation to colonies, the army did not take care of families, so it was not rare that they died of illness on the way.

Permission for marriage was limited, and social services were insufficient, so many soldiers were obliged to be single in colonies. It was not only ranks and file whose marriage permission was limited; officers' marriages were also limited.

3.   Disorderly conduct of single soldiers

Single soldiers had native lovers or wives. Or they indulged in paid sexual service or homosexuality. Some soldiers committed rape.

The army adopted licensed prostitution from the mid-1850s until 1888 in 25 garrisons in India (Ballhatchet 1980:89, Hyam 1998[1990]:171).

III.   Why Did the Army Limit Soldiers' Marriage?

1.   Social and institutional backgrounds

The essential background aspect of the regulation of soldiers' married lives was the financial stringency of the British Army. Because of a lack of financial resources, the British Army cut down on personal expenses and welfare cost.

Due to the low pay, the army could not get desirable recruits easily.

As a result, the army became a refugee for dropouts or villains and the army even induced them to join in the army through liqueur or deception (Burroughs 1994:168).

On the other hand, most officers were from the nobility and gentry. The nobility and gentry could buy officers' rank, so obviously some these officers were not fit for military service.

Between officers from the upper class and ranks and file from the lowest class, there was an insurmountable social gap. High-ranking officials regarded that these ranks and file lacked the moral and intelligence necessary for self-restraint due to their lowest social backgrounds (Ballhatchet 1980:162).

2.   Military backgrounds

Another aspect of marriage regulation was that the army believed that single soldiers had much value from a military viewpoint; it was believed that single soldiers were highly effective (Ballhatchet 1980:35; Hyam 1998[1990]:170). Firstly, single soldiers' loyalty was not so divided between their families and units. Secondly, it was thought that the combat potential of single men exceeded that of married men. Thirdly, the army saw boyishness as quality to be praised.

IV.   The change in gaze on soldiers' marriage

1.   Reforms of the British Army

Military study accomplished remarkable progress in the nineteenth century. As a result, the officers' professionalization was developing in the nineteenth century (Caforio 2006:17). The traditional 'heroic' type personifying martial spirit and personal bravery has been progressively flanked by the managerial type, who reflects the pragmatic and social dimensions of modern warfare (Caforio 2006:17).

However, reforms were not carried out until the middle of the century (Burroughs 1994: 161-162, 178). It was after the great wars such as the Crimean War (1853-1856),

the Indian Mutiny (1857-1859), and the Boer War (1899-1902) that the necessity of radical reforms was fully recognized.

In the Crimean War, the development of communication technology enabled the mass media to instantly report on the war situation and the circumstances of the army back home and provoke general concerns on the war (Streets 2004).

The public came to know about incompetent officers of the noble class and criticised the occupation of power by the class (Burroughs 1994:183). The mass media also reported on soldiers' paid sex and their families' wretched life circumstances. As a consequence, the conservative army became the target of social reform movements.

Within the army also, as the necessity for an effective army was felt strongly, the process of reform started (Gibson 2012:12). It was especially significant to develop officers with high professional military knowledge. In 1871, the purchase and sale of officers' rank was prohibited (Spiers 1994:188).

2.   Recognition of masculinity of married soldiers

In the second half of the nineteenth century, a new type of soldiers came to be praised as a hero, married officers from the middle class who received a professional education. Among all of them, Major General Sir Henry Havelock distinguished himself during the capture of Lucknow in 1857.

What was the background for the appearance of new heroes? Firstly, the professionalism of the military had been established, as cited above. Secondly, the new

norm of a 'modern family' appeared among the bourgeoisie and educated citizens. Domesticity became one motif of a new type of hero adventure stories (Dawson 1994).

The army also started to evaluate married soldiers' masculinity. The evaluation of married men as having qualities of dependability, good and conventional morality, and fitness for promotion to greater authority over their fellows had become common. The new type of officers was expected to show paternal concern toward privates' legal and common-law wives and children.

3.　'Racial degeneration' and single soldiers

It is often said that the colonial rule was justified by social evolutionism, which put the whites at the top of the hierarchy of human sociocultural evolution and emphasised the concept of whites' noble obligation to civilize non-whites.

However, in colonial India, there were phenomena which could invalidate the legitimacy of the colonial rule. They were so-called 'racial degeneration' which was thought to have been brought about by the appearance of 'poor whites', Domicile Europeans, Eurasians and 'Indians' (European women who got married to Indian men, and their descendants).

British privates were involved with all these phenomena. British privates stationed in colonies were from the urban poor class, and their paid sex and rape brought 'discredit on the ruling race' (Ballhatchet 1980:140). The local elites despised the poor whites (Mizutani 2011:54).

Since not-permitted widows and orphans were given no pensions, they would fall into the social category of the poor whites. They could not afford to pay travel expenses back to the UK, so they remained in India and constituted a part of Domicile Europeans. Some widows became barmaids at beer halls, which Indian men also visited, got married to Indian men, and became 'Indian.'

Soldiers who were not permitted marriage or accompanied service had sexual relationships or interracial marriage with native women in the colonies. Their descendants were called 'Eurasians'.

After all, unintentionally, the army continued to reproduce poor whites, Domicile Europeans, 'Indians', and Eurasians by sending soldiers from the poor and being reluctant to permit marriage. The army's policy destroyed the 'homogeneity of [the] European community' (Mizatani 2011) and made a sociobiological boundary between the ruler and the ruled, which the Britons thought to have to exist, an unclear one.

V.   Ranks and File Continued to be Single

As described above, in the second half of the nineteenth century, reforms in the army were started, married soldiers were praised, and 'racial degeneration' caused by single soldiers became a matter of concern.

However, these changes influenced soldiers' marriage only to a limited extent. Although the purchase and sale of officers' rank were prohibited and professionally educated officers gradually increased after the Crimean War, the social background of the officers changed little in the nineteenth century. The reason was that officers had to bear huge costs on account of their small salary, they could not serve without an extra

source of income. The social backgrounds of low-rank privates did not change either due to low pay. Thus, there remained a huge gap in social background between officers and privates.

Although marriage regulation was slackened in 1876, the slack differed by rank. The received wisdom was as follows: 'Subalterns may not marry, captains may marry, majors should marry, and colonels must marry' (Gould 1999:221). High-ranking officials or policy makers did not regard privates from the poor as deserving marriage and the resultant financial burden on the army.

VI.   Conclusion

I discussed the marital status of soldiers and masculinity by taking the example of the British Army in colonial India in the nineteenth century.

The British Army in colonial India maintained strict marriage regulation of soldiers for financial and military reasons until the first half of the nineteenth century. However, in the second half of the 19th century, the approach of the army and the mainland society brought about relaxation in regulations.

Consequently, in the army, the distinction of officers who were expected to get married and privates who were expected to be single occurred. Partial relaxation meant that a plural type of masculinity was recognized in the army: masculinity of husbands or fathers and masculinity of single men. The plural masculinity corresponded to soldiers' social standing and the structure of ranks and appointments in the army.

The relaxation of marriage regulation was also related with the occurrence of a new type of officers – the managerial type. The change in role structure in the modern military forces advanced in relation to the coexistence of plural types of masculinity engendered by married status.

For military forces, soldiers' marriage and reproduction related to not only personal affairs but also to the forces' finance, rank structure, effectiveness, civil-military relations, and family norms.

Reference

Ballhatchet, Kenneth. (1980). *Race, Sex and Class under the Raj: Imperial Attitudes and Policies and Their Critics, 1793-1905*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Burroughs, Peter. (1994). 'An Unreformed Army? 1815-1868.' In *The Oxford History of the British Army*, edited by David Chandler and Ian Beckett, pp. 161-186. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Caforio, Giuseppe. (2006). 'Some Historical Notes,' Giuseppe Caforio ed. *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, pp.7-26, New York: Springer.

Enloe, Cynthia. (2000). *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives*. Berkeley: University of California.

Gibson, Clare. (2012). *Army Childhood: British Army Children's Lives and Times.* Oxford: Shire Publications.

Gould, Tony. (1999). *Imperial Warriors: Britain and the Gurkhas*. London: Granta Books.

Hyam, Ronald. (1998[1990]). *Sekushuariti no teikoku: Kindai Igirisu no sei to shakai*, Translated into Japanese by Takehiko Honda. Tokyo: Kashiwa-shobo. (Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience.)

Lin, Patricia Y. C. E. (2000). 'Citizenship, Military Families, and the Creation of a New Definition of 'Deserving Poor' in Britain, 1793-1815.' *Social Politics*, spring 2000:6-46. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Spiers, Edward. (1994). The Late Victorian Army 1868-1914. In David Chandler and Ian Beckett eds. *The Oxford History of the British Army*, pp.187-210. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Streets, Heather. (2004) *Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture, 1857-1914*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Tan, Tai Yong. (2005). *The Garrison State: The Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947.* New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

The *military family* as a social and political category. Brazil and Portugal in comparative perspective

Helena Carreiras

ISCTE-University Institute of Lisbon/ Portugal

Introduction

'Military family' is a concept that has been extensively used in the social scientific study of the military. Not inadvertently however, in the academic context the plural has been dominant: 'military families', with a very concrete empirical referent: military members and their families. The changing missions of the armed forces, with multinational peace support operations becoming core to most western militaries, has brought a renewed attention to the topic. Increased international missions have meant frequent separations between military personnel and their families. The downsizing and restructuring of military organizations, with significant personnel shrinking, has meant for most soldiers intense pre-deployment training periods and high deployment load. Separation from and support to military families have become critical issues for military forces effectiveness. Academic attention to the topic has followed its greater relevance in social practice (Moelker, et. al, 2015).

However, the concept has also traveled to, and been framed within, the social context of the military and the defense policy-making sphere. Here, the meanings attached to this category have not always been so clearly defined. The empirical referent has sometimes shifted from a grammatically and socially plural reality – military families – to a grammatically and epistemologically singular one: *the* military family, referring to all the

members of the military institution, including their families, gathered under one single umbrella category: *one* family. In this case, 'military family' has been defined as an entity that transcends individuals, where the strong bonds of family ties link the institution and all its members –including family members. Under this frame, the military family comes to embody the core of military identity and values.

Between these two ideal types, however, some nuances exist in the concrete appropriation and uses of the category in different socio-historical contexts. This paper focuses on patterns and differences that have been detected in the institutional and individual narratives that appropriate the category of military family in Portugal and Brazil.

1. Exploring the uses of a social category: a methodological framework

One first requirement to researching the various appropriations of military family as an empirical category, out of the scientific field, is to take into account the analytical level that is targeted. Different analytical levels often imply different research questions, require different research methodologies, data and sources. Therefore, it is not irrelevant to the research of the social and political appropriation of the category of military family, whether the focus is put on macro structures, organizational levels or inter-individual dynamics. Here, the macro analytical level refers to political/institutional policy discourses and practices; the meso level to group collective action and organizational narratives, and the micro level to social interaction patterns and identity formation.

Each of these levels implies different research questions: 1) to what extent has the concept of 'military family' been incorporated into the official defense policy discourse?

2) to what extent has it been mobilized at the organizational and collective action level?

3) How has it been used as a marker of identity by military personnel and their families?

Likewise, the empirical referents are different: the macro level focuses on state policies and MoD orientations, the meso level on the armed forces as an organization or collectively organized sub-groups (such as trade-unions or professional associations), and the micro level brings attention to military members and their families, their interactions and identity. Each level will consequently be informed by different sources and dominantly require different type of data: laws, policies and political discourses for the macro level, organizational documents, interviews and other type of visual and audio data for the meso level and interviews, life documents, observational/ethnographic data for the micro level (Table 1).

Tabel 1 – Methodological framework for analyzing uses of military family

	Macro level	**Meso level**	**Micro level**
Object	Defence policies	Organizational narratives Collective action	Social interaction Identity
Actors	Government MoD	Armed Forces Professional associations Trade-unions	Military personnel Families
Data/sources	Laws and regulations Policy measures Political discourses	Organizational documents Interviews Audio and visual data	Interviews Life documents Observation data Audio and visual data

2. The uses of 'military family' in Portugal and Brazil: a comparative perspective

2.1 Portugal: 'military family' between absence and politicization

In Portugal 'military family' is a rather absent category, both at the macro level of defense policy discourse and action, and at the micro level as an identity category for military personnel. In 2013, almost two decades after the Portuguese armed forces started to send

their soldiers in international peacekeeping missions, there was no specific program or policy aimed at supporting military families. Both from the institutional perspective and from the more informal dimension of social networks, soldiers' families were invisible components of the military social landscape (Carreiras, 2015).

In what concerns state support policies, this absence has been considered puzzling. Unlike many other nations, Portugal knew a rather uncommon pattern of family involvement in military life during the colonial wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guine-Bissau, from 1960 to 1974, when thousands of wives with children followed their husbands to long commissions in Africa. Considering the dominant institutional model of the Portuguese armed forces at the time, as well as the requirements of a war context, it would have been expectable to see families, and especially spouses who became isolated from their previous social networks, being given more institutional attention and being more integrated than they actually were into the military environment and organizational life. At present, with new focus on international missions, a significant number of soldiers deployed, and the perceived importance of family relations for quality of life during missions, again very little specific institutional initiatives (and certainly not a policy) have been developed with the aim of providing social support to soldiers and their families.

At the micro-level of interaction and identity, research has pointed to a detachment from the idea of a military family as a referent for identity: on the contrary, the focus has been much stronger on separation between the worlds of the family and the military. Data from a study of a Portuguese battalion in Kosovo showed that in what regards the topic of institutional support to families, there was among soldiers a rather restrictive understanding of what that support should be, generally equated with facilitating

149

communication and intervention in case of critical incidents. The lack of need for support was rooted on the idea that the military and the family should be two different spheres, two 'separate worlds', as in the following statement:

"I separate the two worlds; when I'm working, I completely forget my personal life, otherwise it would affect my work; when I leave work, I am in my space, I totally forget work because if I don't, it would negatively affect my personal life. (…) If we don't do that, we will create very complicated situations for ourselves and those that surround us in both professional and personal life."[1]

In addition, the idea was put forward that the military cannot fulfill the true needs of the family, either because it lacks resources or because it cannot provide for the type of need at stake. Sometimes, an institutional intervention could even be felt as intrusive:

"I agree [that support should exist] but I also ask: why? Ok, we came here and everything that is done to help those who stayed back home is OK, but help them with what? I think that the only support they need, the one thing they miss, which cannot be replaced is ourselves. Should they put somebody else in our place?[2]

According to Carreiras, "one way to read these results is that families became rather invisible components from the military institutional space not only but also because they have been, and still are, the backbone of an informal social support system that the armed forces have never been pressured or required to institutionalize" (Carreiras, 2015)".

---

[1] Lieutenant M., Platoon commander.

[2] First Sargent G, personnel.

However, during the past decade, we have witnessed the category 'military family' emerge as a significant anchor in military collective action. Military professional associations, namely the three associations for each of the ranks, *Associação dos Oficiais das Forças Armadas* (officers) *Associação de Sargentos* (NCO's), or *Associação de Praças* (enlisted) have periodically used the category to advance their claims for labor and social security rights. Since military trade unions are forbidden by law, the military have organized around professional associations that aim at intermediating the interests of their members close to the political system. It has been in the name of the military family, and because family members were the only ones that could be publicly mobilized, that allowed forms of social protest took place. The marches were explicitly named 'the military family parade'. The wellbeing of the military family – ambiguously defined between a singular entity and the plural military family members conception – was invoked in at least two major occasions in 2012 and 2014, to legitimate a fight over rights .

I.O. CADA VEZ MAIS ALTO, SEMPRE

DIA 15
DESFILE
DA FAMÍLIA
MILITAR
NÃO FALTES!

« If the obligations and demands of the military are different from those of other citizens, then rights must also be different »

« The military are not civil servants »

Source: http://aofa.pt/

These demonstrations integrated military family members - wives, children and other relatives - as well as retired military personnel, claiming for changes in social security, salaries and benefits for the military and their families. One of the marches also included protest against the closing of an all-female college, originally aimed at educating the

daughters of military personnel. If the analytical scope of the I/O thesis is taken into account (Moskos, 1977), what we see here is the activation of a category that can be traced back to a clear institutional frame, to legitimate occupational concerns. The discursive focus is on differentiation from other state bureaucracy agencies and agents, with the most repeated sentence being 'we are not civil servants'.

**2.2 Brasil: military family as a native category and an anchor of identity**

In Brazil, we find a rather different picture with regard to the uses of the military family category and metaphor. Recent work on the topic (Castro, 2018) documents extensively the salience of the category at both the organizational and social interaction levels.

In organizational terms, the military family has been the object of a very different kind of appropriation. Unlike Portugal, here it seems to have been instrumental to strengthen institutional identity, by underlining the unique characteristics of the military and the shared values that hold it together. It was explicitly constructed through the (re)creation of a historical narrative and various ceremonial moments, with the main aim of underlining the community linkages of the military and their families, under the protective umbrella of the institution.

The designation of a patron for the military family, Rosa da Fonseca, as well as the creation of the military family day – on the patron's birth date, 18th September - are two of the events that confer symbolical density to this social construction.

In June 2016 the Army declared D. Rosa da Fonseca (1802-1873) patron of the military family, as a recognition of the "importance of the spirit of sacrifice and fight, which allows army personnel to reach professional and personnel success, with the feeling of accomplished duty, whatever the mission". Mother of seven military sons, of

which three died at war and other became relevant officers and politicians, D. Rosa da Fonseca, "was not chosen by chance", as mentioned in the army web page. She was said to be of 'manly spirit' and an example of patriotic love. Her bust was displayed at the *Escola de Aperfeiçoamento de Oficiais (EsAO)* in the patron's alley of the military vila in Rio de Janeiro, the biggest military garrison in Brazil. She also became the patron of the first class to integrate women at the Military Academy of Agulhas Negras in 2018.

Source: https://www.sangueverdeoliva.com.br/

This official recognition puts emphasis on the role of military wives to the career of their husbands, but, more than that, "it stimulates the feeling of belonging to one family" (Castro, 2018). The military family day is now regularly celebrated by the army in different units around the country.

From the point of view of social interaction and the concrete experiences and identity building at the micro-level, existing data confirms the intense mobilization of the category as an anchor of identity. The work developed by Brazilian researchers shows that unlike Portugal, the 'military family' is for the Brazilian military and their families a truly native category, embodying representations of an idealized family. This goes hand in hand with the predominance in Brazil of the traditional military family, that is, situations in which wives play a supporting and complementary role to their husbands' career, assuming the responsibilities of caring for the nuclear family, but simultaneously participating as full members of the 'military family'. Celso Castro's analysis of autobiographical narratives of military wives shows very well how the reinforcement of the "olive-green family" is done by way of a deep immersion in the military world and its differentiation from the civilian world, but simultaneously by way of the husband's career being assumed as a central project for the whole family. This inextricable association and compromise between domestic and professional values is also reported in other works that document in detail the identification process that leads to the reproduction of the military order, values and hierarchies among military wives. Taken together, in a movement not without conflict, all these dimensions thus strengthen the totalizing project of the institution (Silva, 2018, Chinelli, 2018).

However, even if still dominant, this is not a monolithic portrait. Social and institutional transformations have started to challenge it, namely the tensions arising from changes in the professional role of women and family patterns. Adão stresses that different levels of wives' adherence to the careers of their husbands are a function of different temporalities, and the development of more or less individualizing projects starts to take place (Adão 2018); Pinto underlines a certain dissent in the women's discourses

about the military, the borders and diversities they draw against the doxa of the military family (Pinto, 2018); Monnerat illuminates the tensions, contradictions and conflicts that the real experiences of military women in the conciliation between family life and insertion in the labor market represent to an idealized vision of the military family (Monnerat, 2018).

However, the type of institutional dynamics that characterize the Brazilian army, its territorial implantation and the high mobility that it involves, seem to justify the existence of an *elective affinity* with a traditional family model: one that is characteristic of an institutional model of military organization. The 'military family' still remains an anchor of identity for the military and their families.

Concluding remarks

The observed differences in the uses of the 'military family' category, from an empirical referent to a metaphor, in Portugal and Brazil, are due to both structural and cultural characteristics regarding the military and its relations with society in both countries. On the one hand, there are notorious structural differences in the place and relevance of the military in the state bureaucracies. In Brazil, the historical heritage of the authoritarian military regime still accounts for a defensive reaction of the military against prejudice on the part of various sectors of civil society. The need for differentiation and separation from the civilian world is strong and the reinforcement of the military family is part of that process. Furthermore, the military have kept a high degree of insulation from society, with high levels of self-recruitment (around 60% in the 1990's) and spatial mobility patterns that reinforce this isolation. In Portugal, the active role of the military in the

democratic cup of 1974, as well as the professionalization of the armed forces have prompted greater civil-military convergence. While the Portuguese military have lost weight, decreasing its quantitative presence and its social outreach, the relevance of the military has been kept, if not increased in Brazil. The nature of missions, the compulsory military service system, the territorial spread of the Brazilian military, with its well identified military communities and *vilas,* are in contrast with a much less visible social presence of the Portuguese all-volunteer force, spatially more concentrated and with significant recruitment and retention problems in the enlisted categories. Erosion of material conditions (social security schemes, pensions, health support) in Portugal, following a more general fiscal crisis of the welfare state, also seems to contrast with the prevalence of an ample benefits' scheme in Brazil.

On the other hand, occupational and institutional value orientations highlight divergent paths, with a clear institutional character still dominant in Brazil and an ever-growing occupational value orientation gaining ground among certain categories of the Portuguese military.

In many respects Brazil and Portugal are thus representative cases of very different contextual causal configurations that explain the relative salience of the military family category as well as its uses in social and political practice.

References

Adão, Maria Cecília de Oliveira (2018), Projeto e Individualismo: considerações sobre a adesão das esposas ao projeto profissional dos oficiais do Exército Brasileiro, in Castro, Celso (ed.), *A Família Militar no Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro, FGV.

Carreiras, Helena (2015), "The invisible families of Portuguese Soldiers. From colonial wars to contemporary missions", in Moelker, R. Andres, M., Bowen, G. Manigart, P. (orgs.) *Military Families and War in the 21st Century*, London, Routledge, pp.261-277.

Castro, Celso (ed.), (2018), *A Família Militar no Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro, FGV.

Chinelli, Fernanda (2018) Família militar: apontamentos sobre uma comunidade performada, in Castro, Celso (ed.), *A Família Militar no Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro, FGV.

Moelker, R. Andres, M., Bowen, G. Manigart, P. (orgs.) *Military Families and War in the 21st Century,* London, Routledge.

Monnerat, Sílvia (2018), Estrangeiras em terras desconhecidas: esposas de oficiais do exército, transferências territoriais e inserção no mercado de trabalho, in Castro, Celso (ed.), *A Família Militar no Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro, FGV.

Moskos, Charles C. (1977), 'From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization' *Armed Forces & Society,* 4(1): 41–50.

Pinto, Werusca de Sousa (2018), Construção da subjetividade de mulheres de militares: discursos e contextos, in Castro, Celso (ed.), *A Família Militar no Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro, FGV.

Silva, Cristina Rodrigues da (2018), Famílias na fronteira: experiências de esposas de militares na selva brasileira, in Castro, Celso (ed.), A família Militar no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, FGV.

Military families in Israel –

Characteristics and processes of continuity and change

Uzi Ben-Shalom

Ariel University, Department of Sociology and Anthropology / Israel

Introduction

The topic of military families was of interest for Israeli sociologists, especially since the last decade of the 20th century. Around this time the tension between the military institution and the civilian society drew much more attention to the role of the family in the military service in Israel. Military families in Israel were usually studied using general sociological perspectives, as in other area of research (Rosenhek, Maman & Ben-Ari, 2003).). As a result, there is not enough information about the peculiarities of the Israeli case. For example, the concept of "Greedy Institution" was often used to

describe the detrimental tensions between the institutions of the military and the family (Desivilya & Gal, 1996; Eran-Yona, 2011). The aim of this chapter is adding a complementary information about military families that will suggest additional views on the nature of the Israeli case of military families and the development of this concept over time. In addition, my contention is that the Israeli case is largely shaped by fundamentals of the Israeli security agenda.

The "Old Formula" and functional coexistence of military and family

The "old formula" of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is a description of the Israeli military culture or its "way of war" (Cohen, Bacevich & Eisenstadt, 1998). It includes the principles of Israel's miniature size, its general location between greater Arab nations and its difficulty in supporting a large standing army. As a result, Israel build a large citizen soldiers army with two components: Massive component of compulsory service and reserves and relatively small component of professional volunteers who serves for longer period. I claim that the bulk of the characteristics of the Israeli case study of military families result from this structure. For example, a significant part of the research on military families is interested in family separation and coping following overseas deployment of spouse (Andres, Moelker & Soeters, 2012). Contrary to that the focus of the Israeli case is the separation of a child for mandatory conscription which in many cases is not so far from home, due to Israel's miniature scale. The other case being short term duty of a reservist (Milgram, & Bar, 1993).

The bulk of experiences of Israeli military families relate to the first component – namely: Parenting of compulsory soldiers or military families in which one part – in the past usually a husband - is a member of a reserve unit. The miniature experiences relate

to military families of permanent career soldiers. It is peculiar to note that the bulk of sociological research on military families in Israel relate to the second type of career soldiers' families. One possible explanation for this peculiarity is that an institutional support is required for this topic of research. The research and publication is dependent upon funding and allowing of publication. The issue of career service was perceived as a fundamental manpower challenge and therefore research was invested as part of the efforts to meet its challenges.

The foundations of the "Old Formula" are largely still in existence today and implies that most military families in Israel are either families of compulsory conscripts or wives – in greater numbers today of husbands – of reservists. One of the foundations of the Old Formula was a mutual existence of the military and family. Such coexistence and mutual dependency resulted in a functional coexistence in which the willingness for enlistment by future compulsory soldiers was relatively high and the support from their families was considered by authorities as a given fact. Even radical changes in the manpower resources for military service due to massive immigration waves in the 50s, 70s and 90s or shortages of manpower in the first decade of 2000 did not change the coexistence of military service and the Israeli families. The manifestation of the functional action was a firm support by parents in their drafted children and the relatively low level of protest or refusal to obey the law of compulsory service (Katriel, 1991).

Katriel (1991) showed how military families are coopted with the military and continue supporting their children, now under arms, by unique practices: Supporting their basic needs – even in a miniature and symbolic scale – by visiting their camps on the weekends with comforting food; providing home for vacations with food, laundry

and subsidiary equipment ("Hashlamat Ziud"). "Israeli Compulsory Military Families" constitute an economical and emotional "safe haven" during the prolong and arduous service. Kayriel (1991) argued that by doing so military families avoid the moral questions arises during the occupation of the Palestinians Territories which become an increasingly questionable during the 80s', especially following the first Intifada (1986-1990). The complimentary actions of the drafted children could be described as a "protracted childhood" in which the children, now under arms, remain as "children" while postponing their autonomy, not living their parents' "nest". The literature suggested that this pattern of delayed autonomy is sometimes compensated by journeys abroad for a long duration. Long voyages to locations in South America or East Asia after compulsory service are balancing the period of being part of the "Compulsory Military Family" before committing to an independent professional or livelihood venue.

Challenges to the Old Formula and the research agenda on military and family

The challenges to the "Old Formula" grew following debated inside the Israeli society concerning the occupation of the Palestinian territories. These conflicts were accompanying by the gradual increase in the material and technological superiority by Israel against its rivals. Indeed, the last major war commenced by Israel was the 1982 "First Lebanon War" and the last existential war is the1973 "Yom Kippur War". As a result of these two fundamental processes a question of resources aroused concentrating on the need for the sacrifice of lives in combat and the justification of budget required for the supporting of the massive IDF (Ben-Shalom, 2018). The result of these processes had their toll on the Old Formula and eventually shaped the relationship

between families and the military in Israel. While the IDF remained patriarchic to a large extent it does both change and being changed by its societal environment (Ben-Ari & Levy-Schreiber, 2001). The sociology of the military family in Israel became much more aware of contradictions between the military and families. In addition, many new forms of military families could be identified to be different then the prototypical "Compulsory Service Military Family".

The social movement against the occupation of Southern Lebanon was marked by the actions of "The Mothers Four" movement eventually had a greater effect in the decision to withdraw from Lebanon in 2000 (Lemish & Barzel, 2000). But the cleavages were apparent in many other cases especially concerning families of fallen soldiers and families of POWs. Additional aspect was the preferences of families that their children will be accepted to a high-tech unit which has the premises of greater material advantages following service as compared to combat soldiers. As a result of these tensions military sociologists focused their attentions to issues as understanding the views of military families of compulsory service soldiers and their role on the motivation of young Israelis to enlist (Ben-Shalom & Fox, 2009).

The IDF gradually become more and more reliant of its professional component. The contest over high quality servicemen (and women) against the prosperous Israeli market led to serious concerns of the IDF human resources branch. This contradiction was immanent in the current material and hedonistic Israeli consumeristic society (Levy, 2003). One of the main areas of action was identified as the military and family contradiction. As a result, research projects were launched on the complexities of career soldiers' families. The following citation in one of the leading Israeli sociologists of this topic is a good example:

"... I know and feel that I am only 15% of myself and what I can potentially give in my relationship with Anat and as a father… and so frustrated about it"… My real fantasy is to be a good family man and the clash between the fantasy and my work create so much confusion, tensions and cutoffs… " (Battalion Commander, Regular, cited in Eran-Yona, 2015).

This quotation is far more typical for a Western Army military family then to the citizen soldier tradition of the IDF. It implies the stresses of being tied to the "Greedy Institutions" of being a parent and a combat battalion commander. It also implies the process of professionalization of the IDF and the motivation to invest resources in this study by the human resources branch.

The contradictions inside the Israeli society had their effect on the structure of military families. On the one hand, religious families continue support the military service, especially the arduous combat service. On the other hand, secular and especially left-wing families were more than ever critical on military service. It seems that this difference may had an effect on the style of motivations that "Compulsory Military Families" endorsed. Such a diversity seems like a recent change in the nature of the Israeli family. This diversity is also augmented by the fact the IDF recruit numerous soldiers from minorities as Druze and Bedouin. Such families are largely under researched. In the near future perhaps, such families will be accompanied by compulsory service from Christian and Muslim minorities and also from children of migrant workers. Such diversity to the interest of the Israeli case study of military families since in these cases it is the male who usually serves while in the bulk of the secular Jewish population there is a tendency towards equality and de-gendered conscription and service.

Future research

In my view the future of research on military families in Israel will result from the fundamentals of the "Israeli Way of War". I assume that the fundamentals of this culture will remain the same but some of its social components may undergo changes. The research agenda on military families will have a mixture of continuity and change. On the one hand research topics as families of career soldiers will continue to be of great interest for military sociologists. Especially those who are working for the military. It is likely that the IDF will continue to support only the research efforts that will assist his challenges, for example leveraging the supply-demand of quality manpower. Should the professional component of the IDF continue to shadow the citizen soldier component then military families could become the backbone of the IDF. Such a closure model will drive the IDF towards commonalities with Western nations and future research in Israel could duplicate their prototypical military families. The tendency to avoid risks, now characterizes Israel, will have an effect on the research agenda as well. Coping of families with loss of spouse or children in service. Family support in the military service and especially combat service will likely to be of great interest to military sociologists in the "post heroic" Israeli Society (Ben-Shalom, 2018).

On the other hand, the allocation of manpower that constitute the IDF could be further changed. If it will indeed be the case, the result is likely to yield research on different types of military families. Such examples could be a growing interest in the cases of single parents' family, military families in diverse minority groups including of Ultra-Orthodox Jews. Another example will be of families in which the women has a permanent military career – including in the combat arms (Ben-Shalom, Lewin & Engel, 2019).

References

Andres, M., Moelker, R., & Soeters, J. (2012). A longitudinal study of partners of deployed personnel from the Netherlands' armed forces. *Military Psychology*, *24*(3), 270-288.

Ben-Ari, E., & Levy-Schreiber, E. (2001). Body-Building, Nation-Building : Gender and Military Service in Israel, *Democratic Culture*, 4-5, 99-130 (Hebrew).

Ben-Shalom, U., Lewin, E., & Engel, S. Organizational processes and gender integration in operational military units–an IDF case study. *Gender, Work & Organization*.

Ben-Shalom, U. (2018). Introduction: Israel's post-heroic condition. Israel Affairs. 1-3. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2018.1478783

Ben-Shalom, U., & Fox, S. (2009). Military psychology in the Israel Defense Forces: A perspective of continuity and change. *Armed Forces & Society*, *36*(1), 103-119.

Cohen, E. A., Bacevich, A. J., & Eisenstadt, M. J. (1998). *'Knives, Tanks, and Missiles': Israel's Security Revolution*. Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Desivilya, H. S., & Gal, R. (1996). Coping with Stress in Families of Servicemen: Searching for "Win-Win" Solutions to a Conflict between the Family and the Military Organization. *Family process*, *35*(2), 211-225.

Eran-Jona, M. (2015). Organizational culture and military families: The case of combat officers in the Israeli Defense Forces. In *Military families and war in the 21st century* (pp. 65-78). Routledge.

Eran-Jona, M. (2011). Married to the military: Military-family relations in the Israel defense forces. *Armed Forces & Society*, *37*(1), 19-41.

166

Katriel, T. (1991). Picnics in a military zone: Rituals of parenting and the politics of consensus. *Communal Webs: Communication and Culture in Contemporary Israel*, 71-92.

Lemish, D., & Barzel, I. (2000). Four Mothers' The Womb in the Public Sphere. *European Journal of Communication*, *15*(2), 147-169.

Levy, Y. (2003). Social Convertibility and Militarism: Evaluations of the Development of Military-Society Relations in Israel in the Early 2000s1. *Journal of political and military sociology*, *31*(1), 71.

Milgram, N. A., & Bar, K. (1993). Stress on wives due to husbands' hazardous duty or absence. *Military Psychology*, *5*(1), 21-39.

Rosenhek, Z., Maman, D., & Ben-Ari, E. (2003). The study of war and the military in Israel: An empirical investigation and a reflective critique. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, *35*(3), 461-484.